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According to the traditional view, the shareholders own the cor-
poration. Until relatively recently, this view enjoyed general accep-
tance. Today, however, there seems to be substantial agreement
among legal scholars and others in the academy that shareholders do
not own corporations. In fact, the claim that shareholders do own
corporations often is dismissed as merely a "theory, " a "naked asser-
tion," or even a "myth." And yet, outside of the academy, views on
the corporation remain quite traditional. Most people- not just the
public and the media, but also politicians, and even bureaucrats and
the courts-seem to believe that the shareholders do, in fact, own cor-
porations.
Why this disconnect? I believe that contemporary scholarship
has done a better job of critiquing shareholder ownership than of dis-
proving it. In this Article, I provide a defense of the traditional view
by evaluating many of the arguments commonly raised against share-
holder ownership and showing how they fall short. I then explain
why the issue matters. As a theoretical matter, the issue of ownership
is necessary to a proper understanding of the nature of the corpora-
tion and corporate law. As a practical matter, it is an important con-
sideration in the allocation of rights in the corporation: if sharehold-
ers are owners, then the balance of rights will tip more heavily in their
favor, and against others, than if they are not. Ownership may not
settle any specific question of corporate governance, but it will make a
significant difference in the analysis. Because the issue of ownership
has the potential to shape all of corporate law and direct the very pur-
pose of corporations, it is of utmost importance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The principle that shareholders own the companies in which they
invest-and are the ultimate bosses of those running them-is cen-
tral to modern capitalism."
-Arthur Levitt Jr.1
According to the traditional view, the shareholders own the corpo-
ration.2 The corporation is a separate legal entity, with an identity dis-
tinct from that of its owners. Its governing body is the board of directors.
The law authorizes the board of directors to manage the business and af-
fairs of the corporation. However, as owners, the shareholders are en-
titled to elect directors. In addition, the law charges the directors with
fiduciary duties to pursue the best interests of the shareholders. As for
everyone else-such as employees, creditors, and customers-they are
simply third parties who contract with the corporation at arm's length,
much as they would with a sole proprietor. Everyone profits from mu-
tually beneficial contracts, and society benefits from the opportunities
that corporations create for its citizens.
1. Arthur Levitt Jr., How to Boost Shareholder Democracy, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2008, at A17.
2. For a general description of the traditional view, see Larry D. Soderquist & Robert P. Vec-
chio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate Responsibility: New Guidelines for Management,
1978 DuKE L.J. 819, 819-25; see also Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 407,437-39 (2006).
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Until relatively recently, the traditional view enjoyed general accep-
tance.3 It is both simple and intuitive. The only real strain on the theory
stems from the separation of ownership and control in public corpora-
tions.' As a result, many have found it difficult to view public sharehold-
ers as owners in the same sense that sole proprietors are owners. Never-
theless, the traditional view has long proven resilient. For the most part,
critics had accepted its premises and merely sought to promote a greater
sense of corporate social responsibility.' Today, however, there seems to
be substantial agreement among legal scholars and others in the academy
that shareholders do not own corporations. How did this come to pass?
It would take a major reconceptualization of the nature of the cor-
poration to displace shareholders as owners. A few decades ago, the law
and economics movement provided just that with its nexus-of-contracts,
or contractarian, theory of the corporation.6 Under this view, the corpo-
ration is not a thing capable of being owned. Rather, it is a nexus of con-
tracts among various parties. Each of the participants in the corporate
enterprise makes an investment in the corporation in exchange for a con-
tractual right to a return on his or her investment. As a result, share-
holders have no special role in the corporation; their rights, like everyone
else's, are limited to those provided by contract.7
Nevertheless, contractarians generally believe that the corporation
should pursue shareholder interests for two reasons: first, because the
shareholders have contracted for this; and second, because it is the effi-
cient outcome.8 However, this pro-shareholder position does not follow
inevitably from the basic premises. It is possible to accept some of the
basic principles of the nexus-of-contracts theory and come to very differ-
ent conclusions. Progressive corporate law scholars have done essential-
ly that in developing a communitarian theory of the corporation.9 The
fact that shareholders have no special status in the corporation led them
to the conclusion that the corporation should be run, not in the interests
of shareholders alone, but rather in the interests of society as a whole.10
Although they end up in very different places, contractarians and
communitarians agree on the principle that shareholders do not own
corporations. This is the view that currently enjoys general acceptance in
3. Levitt, supra note 1.
4. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 277-87 (1933).
5. See, e.g., David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform
Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 9-10 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
6. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 4-8 (1991); MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE,
RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 1-3 (2000).
7. See JENSEN, supra note 6, at 1.
8. See Velasco, supra note 2, at 445-49 (describing contractarian theory).
9. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 5; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 319-28 (1999); Kent Greenfield, New Principles for
Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 87, 89 (2005).
10. See Velasco, supra note 2, at 455-56 (describing communitarian theory).
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scholarly circles. In fact, the claim that shareholders do own corpora-
tions often is dismissed as merely a "theory,'" a "naked assertion,"'2 or
even a "myth."' 3 And yet, outside of the academy, views on the corpora-
tion remain quite traditional. Most people-not just the public1" and the
media, 5 but also politicians, 6 and even bureaucrats 7 and the courts' s-
seem to believe that the shareholders do, in fact, own corporations. That
the public, the media, and even politicians hold this view may not cause
11. Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147,
147 (2001).
12. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1189, 1190 (2002).
13. Theresa A. Gabaldon, Like a Fish Needs a Bicycle: Public Corporations and Their Share-
holders, 65 MD. L. REV. 538, 538 (2006).
14. For a sampling of sources to which the public is likely to turn for information, see EDWARD
T. KOCH ET AL., THE COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO INVESTING 5 (3d ed. 2005) ("[Clommon stock
represents ownership in a company."); 3 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MICROPDIA 647
(15th ed. 2002) ("The owners of the corporation in a legal sense are the shareholders ..."); U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Minority Bus. Dev. Agency, Business Structure in Detail (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://www.mbda.gov/?section-id=5&bucket-id=123&content - id=2383&well=entire-page&method=
printer#corp ("A corporation is a legal entity separate from the individuals who own or operate it.
The shareholders, people who invest money in the company, are the owners of the corporation."); Wi-
kipedia, Shareholder, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shareholder (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) ("A compa-
ny's shareholders collectively own that company."); Investopedia, Shareholder, http://www.
investopedia.com/terms/s/shareholder.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) ("Shareholders are the owners of
a company.").
15. See Stout, supra note 12, at 1190 ("This assertion ["that the public corporation 'belongs' to its
shareholders"] is frequently employed by commentators in the popular media and business press to
justify shareholder primacy.").
16. See, e.g., Interview by Larry Kudlow with President George W. Bush, (May 8, 2006), http://
kudlowsmoneypolitics.blogspot.com/2006/05/my-interview-with-president-bush.html ("PRESIDENT
BUSH: .... [P]roxies are sometimes very difficult to understand .... In my view, there ought to be a
very straightforward, transparent explanation to the owners of the company-the shareholders-and
let them come to their own conclusions.") (alteration in original); Letter from Senator Chris Dodd et
al. to Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Nov. 1, 2007) (on file with author),
available at http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/4113 ("Shareholders are the owners of a public
company and have a right to meaningfully participate in electing directors .... ).
17. See, e.g., "Options Backdating": Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban
Affairs, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore id=
5le26ade-2d6b-4dfc-9b89-64484a472e77 ("The purpose of the new executive compensation rules is to
make the CEO's pay understandable to the shareholders who own the company."); Nominations of:
Mary Schapiro, Christina D. Romer, Austan D. Goolsbee, Cecilia E. Rouse, and Daniel K. Tarullo:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban "Affairs, 111th Cong. 92 (2009) (Mary
Schapiro responding to a written question from Sen. Carl Levin) ("A central tenet of our market sys-
tem is that shareholders are the owners of the company in which they hold shares, and they should
have a way to hold their representatives-members of the board of directors-accountable for their
actions."); Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Commencement Address at the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (May 15, 2005), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050515/default.htm ("The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 .... importantly reinforced the principle that shareholders own our corporations and that
corporate managers should be working on behalf of shareholders ...."); see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, FACr SHEET: ENSURING INVESTORS HAVE A SAY ON PAY (2009), http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/factsheet-say%20on%20pay.pdf (repeatedly referring to shareholders as own-
ers of companies).
18. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101
(Del. 2007) (quoting Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998)); Stokes v. Cont'l Trust Co., 78 N.E.
1090,1093 (N.Y. 1906).
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academics much concern. However, that bureaucrats and the courts-
the legal experts -do is significantly more troubling.
Why this disconnect? I believe that contemporary scholarship has
done a better job of critiquing shareholder ownership than of disproving
it. Given its historical significance as well as its current widespread ac-
ceptance outside the academy, the traditional view is the starting point
for discussion, and its critics bear the burden of persuasion. The argu-
ments that have been raised against it thus far fall short. They may man-
age to raise the reader's level of discomfort with the traditional view, but
they do not require her to reject it. In reality, they are arguments that
shareholders should not be owners rather than that they are not owners.
The nexus-of-contracts theory has achieved the success it has among
scholarly circles by providing a viable alternative - a holistic account of
the corporation that is both coherent and plausible. However, it has not
proven compelling enough to displace the traditional view outside of the
academy.
In this Article, I provide a defense of the traditional view by eva-
luating many of the arguments commonly raised against shareholder
ownership. In Part II, I consider the arguments that form the core of the
contemporary critique of the traditional view and show how each of the
arguments falls short. In Part III, I turn to additional arguments often
leveled against the traditional view that allow me to develop an affirma-
tive case-that the shareholders really do own the corporation and that it
makes sense to consider them owners. Throughout Parts II and III, I
hope to demonstrate that corporate law generally is not only consistent
with, but actually an embodiment of, the traditional view. Ultimately, I
do not expect to prove to everyone's satisfaction that the traditional view
is correct. However, I do hope to demonstrate that others have not es-
tablished the opposite and that the traditional view remains viable.
Thus, my goal is to rekindle an important debate in corporate law rather
than to settle it.
This endeavor naturally leads to the question of why: why does
shareholder ownership matter? It matters on both a theoretical and
practical level. As a theoretical matter, the issue of ownership is neces-
sary to a proper understanding of the nature of the corporation and cor-
porate law. As a practical matter, it is an important consideration in the
allocation of rights in the corporation: if shareholders are owners, then
the balance of rights will tip more heavily in their favor, and against oth-
ers, than if they are not. This is particularly important at a time when
corporate governance is undergoing serious reconsideration. Proposals
for the expansion of shareholder rights, including majority voting, proxy
access, and say-on-pay, as well as caps on executive compensation, have
been dominating the headlines.19 The issue of shareholder ownership will
19. See, e.g., Clark S. Judge & Richard Torrenzano, Capitalism by Proxy Fight, WALL ST. J., Nov.
23, 2009, at A21; Jeffrey McCracken & Kara Scannell, Fight Brews As Proxy Access Nears, WALL ST.
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have an important bearing on these debates. Thus, regardless of the
normative desirability of shareholder rights, the issue is an important
one. Advocates on both sides should be concerned, albeit for very dif-
ferent reasons.
In Part IV, I address some of the consequences of shareholder own-
ership. First, I argue that shareholder rights would be stronger and more
secure if based on property than on contract. Next, I argue that, if
shareholders are owners, then the purpose of the corporation must be to
pursue their interests, and the goal of corporate governance must be to
effectuate their collective will-not immediately and in every particular,
of course, but generally and ultimately. In other words, shareholder pri-
macy becomes the fundamental value of corporate governance, in terms
of both end and means. Finally, I argue that, if shareholders are owners,
then accountability for the directors who are charged with managing the
business on their behalf is an appropriate and indispensible aspect of
corporate law. I do not maintain that ownership will settle any specific
question of corporate governance. Rather, my claim is that it will make a
significant difference in the analysis. Because the issue of ownership has
the potential to shape all of corporate law and direct the very purpose of
corporations, it is of utmost importance.
In Part V, I conclude with a more detailed account of the traditional
view. One problem with an endeavor such as the one attempted in this
Article is that it must deal discreetly with arguments that ultimately are
interrelated. In order to reintegrate the arguments, I attempt to synthes-
ize various claims made throughout this Article in the form of an easily
digestible narrative. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate not only that the
traditional view is perfectly viable, but also why it is reasonable for those
outside of the academy to adhere to it.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE
In this Part, I consider the arguments that form the core of the con-
temporary critique of the traditional view. First, I argue that the corpo-
ration is capable of being owned. Then I argue that shareholders have
the type of control that could be expected of co-owners. Next, I examine
the status of shareholders as the residual claimants. Thereafter, I dem-
onstrate that options theory does not undermine shareholder ownership.
Finally, I turn to competing theories of the firm: first contractarian
theory and then communitarian theory. I argue that, although they can
be helpful in understanding the complexities of the modern corporation,
J., Aug. 26, 2009, at Cl; Gretchen Morgenson, When a Company Tries It, a 'Say on Pay' Works, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 2009, at B1; Restraints on Executive Pay: Attacking the Corporate Gravy Train, THE
ECONOMIST, May 30, 2009, at 71-73; see also Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th
Cong. (as referred to the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, May 19,2009).
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these theories do not displace the traditional view in terms of descriptive
accuracy.
A. Is the Corporation Capable of Being Owned?
A common claim among contemporary corporate law scholars is
that the corporation is not a thing capable of being owned. If this is true,
the shareholders not only do not, but cannot, own the corporation. This
facial challenge to the traditional view is most often made by contracta-
rians. Professor Stephen Bainbridge explains as follows:
[C]ontractarians reject the idea that the firm is a thing capable of
being owned.... Someone owns each of [the various factors of pro-
duction in the corporation], but no one owns the nexus itself. To be
sure, most theories of the firm agree, shareholders own the residual'
claim on the corporation's assets and earnings.... Yet, ownership
of the residual claim is not the same as ownership of the firm itself.2
This claim is a fairly narrow one. Contractarians generally accept that
there are things capable of being owned; they simply deny that the cor-
poration is one of them.
21
This claim is not so much an argument as it is a conclusion. More
precisely, it states only that "ownership is not a meaningful concept in
nexus of contracts theory." 22 In other words, given the contractarian de-
scription of the corporation, it is inappropriate to describe the share-
holder interest as an ownership claim. Of course, this conclusion de-
pends entirely upon the accuracy of the contractarian account, which will
be taken up in a later Section.
23
An argument that shareholders are not owners because the corpora-
tion is not a thing capable of being owned would be circular. It also
would be rather weak-at least if one were to accept the concept of own-
ership generally. To be sure, the corporation is not a tangible item to
which the shareholder can physically point and say, "this is mine." How-
ever, ownership interests exist in intangible items as well. For example,
the law recognizes ownership interests in various forms of intellectual
property such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks.24 More important-
ly, the law also recognizes ownership interests in other forms of business
20. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 564-65 (2003) (footnote omitted); see also Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and
the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290 (1980).
21. The position taken by contractarians clearly is meant to evoke the realist account of proper-
ty-as relations among people rather than as thing-ownership. However, it does not actually subscribe
to that theory by minimizing the significance of property. To the contrary, it recognizes the impor-
tance of property as a prerequisite to contract. Thus, I interpret the contractarian claim not as denying
property but merely as denying corporations the status of property. The broader property claim of the
realists is considered in the second half of this Section.
22. Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply
to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1427 (1993).
23. See infra Part I.E.
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052,1057 (2006); 17 U.S.C. §§ 102,201 (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§ 101,261 (2006).
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organization, such as sole proprietorships and partnerships.,, There is no
reason why the corporate form uniquely would make a business incapa-
ble of being owned.
Scholars often warn against reification of the corporation.26 The
concern is that "reification is a device for making something that is in fact
complex seem simple, and that can be dangerous."'  However, even crit-
ics admit that "reification may sometimes be a useful device"8 and that
"it would be difficult to communicate effectively without it." 9 Thus, the
problem is not reification per se, but oversimplification. Although we
should proceed with caution, there is no need to abandon reification al-
together. The traditional view is perfectly capable of dealing with the
fact that separate entity status is a legal fiction and that there are real
people with real interests involved. Reification of the corporation does
not cause insurmountable problems. In any event, the corporation can
be a thing that is capable of being owned-if the law so provides.
The claim that the corporation is not a thing capable of being owned
also can be construed much more broadly to raise fundamental questions
about the concept of ownership. A property law scholar might ask
whether anything is capable of being owned, and whether ownership is a
meaningful concept at all. Of course, that is a topic far beyond the scope
of this Article. Nevertheless, it should be considered, if only briefly.
The traditional account of property in the common law was that
property was a thing that was owned by a person? An owner had com-
plete dominion over his property, subject only to specific legal restric-
tions. Such restrictions were viewed as exceptions to the general rule
and, implicitly at least, every regulation required justification.
An extreme version of this position was set forth by William Black-
stone. In his Commentaries, he defined property as "that sole and des-
potic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual
in the universe."3 Of course, the traditional view of property was never
quite so absolute. Even Blackstone realized that there were numerous
exceptions that whittled down the rights of ownership substantially.
32
25. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 202(a) (1997).
26. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 117-18 (10th ed. 2007); G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected
Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REv. 887, 888-93 (2000).
27. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 26, at 118; see also Gulati et al., supra note 26, at 890 ("De-
pending on its uses, however, reification can also be a barrier to effective analysis.").
28. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 26, at 118.
29. Gulati et al., supra note 26, at 890.
30. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1335-36 (9th ed. 2009).
31. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
32. See FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 13 (1985) ("Blackstone's sweeping definition... overstated the case; indeed, he de-
voted the succeeding 518 pages of book 2 of his Commentaries... to qualifying and specifying the ex-
ceptions to his definition.").
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Nevertheless, some legal scholars found the traditional account of prop-
erty difficult to accept. They saw property rights as much more limited
and fluid than Blackstone suggested.
In the early twentieth century, legal realists developed their own
theory of property. They described it as a "bundle of rights."33 The pur-
ported owner does not have complete dominion over an asset, but only
certain rights with respect to it. Others may have rights with respect to
the asset as well. In other words, property rights are not absolute. As a
result, regulation of property does not require much justification: limits
are to be expected. 34
While the realist account of property seemed to overcome some of
the shortcomings of the traditional account, it had certain problems of its
own. As Professor Thomas Grey has noted, "[t]he substitution of a bun-
dle-of-rights for a thing-ownership conception of property has the ulti-
mate consequence that property ceases to be an important category in
legal and political theory. ' 35 While Grey did not see this as a problem, it
certainly makes discussion of property difficult. If there is no such thing
as property, then of course the corporation cannot be owned. However,
it clearly is not the case that property is a meaningless concept under ex-
isting law; to the contrary, property is a constitutionally protected right.
36
Thus, I assume in this Article that the disintegration of property is less
than complete and that the concept of property is meaningful.
Logically, neither the traditional nor the realist account of property
necessarily leads to any specific conclusions. Thing-ownership, for ex-
ample, is generally associated with broad rights and limited regulation.
However, because property rights have always been understood to be
subject to legal restrictions, thing-ownership can be reconciled quite easi-
ly with a world of pervasive regulation. Likewise, the bundle-of-rights is
generally associated with limited rights and expansive regulation. That
said, if people are understood to have a property interest in each right in
the bundle, then even minor regulation could be considered a compensa-
33. See A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113 (A.G. Guest
ed., 1961); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 21-24 (1913); see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY 2-3 (2d ed. 2005).
34. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Econom-
ics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 365 (2001).
[T]he motivation behind the realists' fascination with the bundle-of-rights conception was mainly
political. They sought to undermine the notion that property is a natural right, and thereby
smooth the way for activist state intervention in regulating and redistributing property. If proper-
ty has no fixed core of meaning, but is just a variable collection of interests established by social
convention, then there is no good reason why the state should not freely expand or, better yet,
contract the list of interests in the name of the general welfare.
Id. at 365 (footnote omitted).
35. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 81 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
36. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
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ble taking.3 7 In the end, both accounts can accommodate any type of
property interest.
Although the realist account of property has been the dominant
view in the academy for quite some time, it has had difficulty gaining ac-
ceptance among ordinary people. As even proponents of the bundle-of-
rights theory will admit, the traditional account is stubborn.38 Recently,
there have been scholars willing to challenge the new orthodoxy.3 9 For
example, in a series of insightful articles, Professors Thomas Merrill and
Henry Smith have argued that the in rem nature of certain rights is ne-
cessary for a proper understanding of property law. 4° Among the bene-
fits of the traditional account are increased stability and reduced transac-
tion costs, 41 both of which are considered beneficial in the business world.
The traditional view of the corporation may seem more comfortable
in the world of traditional property law. However, it has survived for
decades in a world where the realist account is dominant. In fact, the
traditional view of the corporation arguably is a better fit with the bun-
dle-of-rights theory, which is perfectly comfortable with shareholders
having certain rights normally associated with ownership and not others.
The intangible nature of corporations is significantly less troubling when
property means rights rather than things. In short, there is nothing in
bundle-of-rights theory that prevents shareholders in particular from be-
ing considered owners. Shareholders' rights may not seem quite as ro-
bust as some other owners' rights, but one of the key insights of the real-
ist account is that property rights are neither simple nor uniform.42
Perhaps the most satisfying defense of the corporation as property is
the argument by analogy. The traditional view of the corporation can be
considered perfectly viable because the corporation bears a strong family
resemblance to another generally accepted form of property: the trust.
In a trust, as in a corporation, there is a separation of ownership and con-
trol. In a trust, the beneficiary is the beneficial owner while control is
given to the trustee, who is charged with managing the trust for the bene-
37. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 28 (1977) ("When-
ever the state takes any user right out of Jones's bundle and puts it in any other bundle, private proper-
ty should be understood to have been taken.").
38. See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REv. 711,714
(1996) (arguing "that this 'dominant paradigm' is really no explanatory model at all, but represents the
absence of one").
40. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Numerus
Clausus]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REv.
773, 777 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Interface]; Merrill & Smith, supra note 34, at 359.
41. See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 40, at 24-25, 33-34; Merrill & Smith, In-
terface, supra note 40, at 792-97; Merrill & Smith, supra note 34, at 387.
42. The real issue under bundle-of-rights theory is whether others can be considered owners of
the corporation as well, and that will be taken up in a later Section. See infra text accompanying note
148.
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fit of the beneficiaries.13 This is the essential framework of the corpora-
tion: the shareholders are the beneficial owners but control is given to
the directors, who are charged with managing the corporation for the
benefit of the shareholders.' So, just as trust beneficiaries are the bene-
ficial owners of the trust, so too the shareholders are the beneficial own-
ers of the corporation.
Although the corporation has often been analogized to a trust, it is
not literally a trust; it is sui generis.45 In fact, shareholders have more of
the rights normally associated with ownership than do trust beneficiaries.
Shareholders have a significant element of control in that they have the
power to elect and remove directors, whereas trust beneficiaries general-
ly do not have the power to select or remove trustees. In addition,
shareholders get to vote on certain fundamental matters, whereas benefi-
ciaries generally have no input. Thus, the corporation actually is less
problematic as property than the trust.
In short, there is no logical reason why the law could not treat the
corporation as the property of the shareholders. If there is any argument
in the claim that the corporation is not capable of being owned, it is not
that the law does not or cannot recognize an ownership interest in the
corporation, but only that it should not.
B. Do Shareholders Have Control?
The most common argument against the traditional view is that
shareholders cannot be considered the owners of the corporation be-
cause they lack the most important right of ownership: control. The logic
is straightforward: "An owner has the power to control the property she
owns." 6 Shareholders do not have control. Therefore, shareholders are
not owners.
As we have seen in the previous Section, property law is not so sim-
ple. Ownership never conveys absolute control,47 and "rights associated
with ownership can be unbundled or disaggregated." In other words,
control is not a binary issue. In fact, it is not even indispensible to own-
ership. Various property interests separate ownership from control. For
example, in a lease, the lessor is the owner but the lessee has control over
the asset for the term of the lease.4 1 More significantly, in a trust, the be-
neficiaries are the beneficial owners but the trustee has control over the
trust assets. Thus, even a complete absence of control would not be a
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
44. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1, at 179-80 (2000).
45. See Velasco, supra note 2, at 438-39.
46. SINGER, supra note 33, at 2.
47. Id. at 3 ("[Plroperty rights are limited to protect both the property and personal rights of
others, as well as the interests of the community.").
48. Id.
49. Id. at 437.
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sufficient basis to conclude that shareholders are not the owners of the
corporation. However, shareholders are not completely lacking in con-
trol.
The control argument can take various forms. Scholars often focus
on the fact that shareholders lack control over the assets of the corpora-
tion. Professor Margaret M. Blair, for example, has noted that "[o]wning
shares of stock in a company does not mean shareholders can move
themselves into a comer office, take the corporate jet out for a test flight,
or order the company to hire their children." 5 She is correct; the power
to direct the corporation and control its assets belongs to the directors.
However, this is perfectly consistent with the traditional view. Share-
holders should not be expected to have control over the business assets
for the simple reason that they do not own them. Shareholders own the
corporation; the corporation owns the business assets. Because directors
are the parties authorized to manage the business, they are the ones with
control over the corporate assets.
This system makes perfect sense. A business could not function if
every owner had equal access to the business assets for personal use.
Given the co-owners' shared interest in the assets, it is necessary to have
some limits to access and rules for control. Business law provides for dif-
ferent forms of organization to meet different needs. A partnership, for
example, allows co-owners to act independently (unless they agree oth-
erwise).51 However, even partners are only entitled "to possess specific
partnership property for partnership purposes. 52 A corporation, on the
other hand, does not allow the co-owners to act independently (unless
they agree otherwise).13 Instead, shareholders act together to elect direc-
tors who are given control over the assets. Both methods are perfectly
reasonable ways to allocate control when there are multiple owners.
Others could be imagined. None should be deemed to undermine the
ownership interest. Thus, shareholders do not lack control; they merely
exercise their control indirectly, through elected representatives.
The control argument is more effective when it refers to control
over the corporation itself. Professor Bainbridge makes the case that
shareholders lack control over the corporation as follows:
[S]hareholder control rights .are so weak that they scarcely qualify
as part of corporate governance. Instead, corporate law vests the
board of directors with a nonreviewable power of discretionary fiat.
For example, under the Delaware code, shareholder voting rights
are essentially limited to the election of directors, and the approval
of charter or by-law amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all
50. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 34 (1995); see also Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 564
n.81; Stout, supra note 12, at 1191.
51. UNWF. P'SHIP Acr § 18(e) (1914); see also REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 401(0 (1997).
52. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 25(2)(a); see also REVISED UNIF. P'SHiP ACT § 401(g).
53. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7 (2006).
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of the corporation's assets, and voluntary dissolution. As a formal
matter, only the election of directors and amending the by-laws do
not require board approval before shareholder action is possible.
In practice, of course, even the election of directors, absent a proxy
contest, is predetermined by the existing board nominating the next
board.
These direct restrictions on shareholder power are supple-
mented by a host of other rules that indirectly prevent shareholders
from exercising significant influence over corporate decision-
making. Three sets of statutes are especially noteworthy:
(1) disclosure requirements pertaining to large holders,
(2) shareholder voting and communication rules, and (3) insider
trading and short swing profits rules. These laws affect sharehold-
ers in two respects. First, they discourage the formation of large
stock blocks. Second, they discourage communication and coordi-
nation among shareholders. As a result, shareholders neither own
sufficient stock to exercise meaningful control over the firm nor do
they band together to exercise such control. 4
Although Bainbridge may overstate the matter somewhat, it is difficult
to deny that direct shareholder control over the corporation is quite li-
mited in fact.
51
Of course, this limited control in fact is true only of public corpora-
tions with dispersed shareholders. In closely held corporations, share-
holders often have significant control in fact. And, when there is only
one shareholder-as is the case with wholly owned subsidiaries of public
corporations, for example -the shareholder has complete control in fact.
Thus, it is not the corporate form, but rather dispersed ownership, that
reduces shareholder influence.
Even in public corporations, however, shareholders are able to ex-
ercise a great deal of influence. For example, consider the election of di-
rectors. Because of plurality voting, it long has been impossible for
shareholders to remove directors without a proxy contest. 6 Neverthe-
less, directors often have found it difficult to remain on the board in the
face of a significant minority of withhold votes.57 Thus, shareholders ar-
guably have had more power in fact than the law and circumstances sug-
gest they should. 8 Moreover, in recent years, shareholders have become
a much more powerful voice in corporate governance. With respect to
54. Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 569-70 (footnotes omitted).
55. See Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 609-20
(2007).
56. See id. at 611-12.
57. See, e.g., Ronald Grover & Tom Lowry, Now It's Time to Say Goodbye: How Disney's Board
Can Move Beyond the Eisner Era, Bus. WK., Mar. 15, 2004, at 31 (discussing election at 2004 Annual
Meeting of Walt Disney Co., where forty-three percent of shareholders withheld support for Chair-
man and CEO Michael D. Eisner, leading to his replacement as Chairman).
58. To my knowledge, no one has suggested that shareholders should be able to elect or remove
directors by less than a majority vote.
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elections, their demands for reform have led many corporations to re-
place the plurality voting standard with a majority voting standard, or at
least a modified plurality voting standard. 9 This change will make it sig-
nificantly easier for shareholders to remove directors in the future. Thus,
shareholder influence should not be underestimated. 6°
It is true that, with rare exceptions, each individual shareholder of a
public corporation is virtually powerless. That being said, this is entirely
appropriate because, with rare exceptions, each individual shareholder
owns only a very small percentage of a public corporation. Thus, under
the traditional view, he or she ought to have only a very small say in the
corporation. However, shareholders in the aggregate have significant
control over the corporation. It is undeniable that, if they work together,
public shareholders can remove existing directors and elect new directors
of their choosing. Thus, the argument that shareholders lack control
rests not on actual powerlessness, but primarily on the existence of pre-
sumably insurmountable collective action and coordination problems.
To be sure, economic incentives often make it difficult for individu-
al shareholders to become engaged in corporate governance. However,
the incentives are not nearly so problematic for institutional sharehold-
ers, who typically have much larger holdings.61 In fact, a significant part
of the problem may be the existence of artificial obstacles created by
laws that were intended to help shareholders.62 One important example
is the federal proxy rules, which were intended to help shareholders ex-
ercise their voting rights but which also prevent them from coordinating
with each other freely.63 Thus, it may not be fair to say that shareholders
lack control. Rather, it may be more accurate to say that federal law
prevents shareholders from exercising their ownership rights under state
law. It would be inappropriate to deny shareholders ownership under
state law because of the unintended consequences of federal law.
Moreover, shareholders do not need to band together in order to
exercise control. Instead, the market for corporate control can unite
them.64 When dissatisfied shareholders sell their shares, there is a nega-
tive impact on the company's stock price. This makes the company more
vulnerable to a hostile takeover. When the price is low enough, third
59. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS vii (2007),
http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy 1 1207.pdf.
60. Of course, the real response of the traditional view would be that if shareholders lack the
type of control that is associated with ownership, then it ought to be given to them. However, the
point in the text is that shareholders are not as lacking in control as is often suggested.
61. See Velasco, supra note 55, at 623-24.
62. See id. at 609-21.
63. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,
39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 823-24 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 520, 536-41 (1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity].
64. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110,
112-14 (1965); see also Fred S. McChesney, Manne, Mergers, and the Market for Corporate Control, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 245 (1999).
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parties may be willing to step in and buy the corporation. In doing so,
the acquirer will be solving the shareholders' coordination and collective
action problems by presenting them with a simple decision: to sell or not
to sell. In a successful takeover, at least, the shareholders are in control:
the public shareholders decide whether to sell the company, and the suc-
cessful acquirer decides whether to replace existing management.
Finally, critics may argue that the extent of the directors' power and
discretion is problematic for the traditional view. Corporate law statutes
almost uniformly provide that "[t]he business and affairs of every corpo-
ration.., shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of direc-
tors ... "65 Courts tend to read this language expansively: director au-
thority is said to be "original and undelegated," 66 and directors are re-
required to exercise their own business judgment rather than follow the
shareholders' instructions.67 Moreover, as long as directors are not en-
gaged in self-dealing, their decisions will be upheld "if they can be attri-
buted to any rational business purpose."' All of this may seem inconsis-
tent with shareholder ownership.69 However, the breadth of director
authority must be put into context. Shareholders elect directors and di-
rectors have a fiduciary duty to manage the business in the best interests
of the shareholders. Thus, the directors are the elected representatives
of the shareholders.70 Under the traditional view, the board of directors
is not supposed to be at odds with shareholders; rather, it is supposed to
be an institution that enables dispersed shareholders to exercise their
control rights indirectly.71 It may fall short of the ideal, as most institu-
tions do, but that cannot be the basis for denying the shareholders' own-
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.01(b) (2008).
66. See N. Assurance Co. v. Rachlin Clothes Shop, Inc., 125 A. 184, 188 (Del. 1924) (quoting
Hoyt v. Thompson's Ex'r, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Manson v.
Curtis, 119 N.E. 559,562 (N.Y. 1918).
67. See People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911); cf. Grimes v. Donald, 673
A.2d 1207, 1214 (Del. 1996) (explaining that directors cannot abdicate responsibilities for managing
business).
68. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.31 cmt., at 8-232 (2009) (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Le-
vien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74
(Del. 2006).
69. A related argument would be that it is more accurate to describe the directors as owners than
the shareholders. This might find support in judicial statements such as that made by the New York
Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 98 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911): "The corporation is
the owner of the property, but the directors in the performance of their duty possess it, and act in
every way as if they owned it." Such statements are perfectly consistent with the traditional view,
which holds that shareholders own the corporation, the corporation owns the business assets, and the
directors manage the business. However, the final portion of the quoted language is somewhat an
overstatement. Directors cannot "act in every way as if they owned" the corporate assets. They can-
not, for example, take them for personal use or consumption. Rather, their use of corporate property
is limited to "the performance of their duty." In other words, they are like trustees, which is the tradi-
tional view. In fact, the opinion makes this clear in context. See id.
70. According to the Delaware Supreme Court, "[tihe power of managing the corporate enter-
prise is vested in the shareholders' duly elected board representatives." MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio,
Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989)).
71. See Velasco, supra note 2, at 440-42.
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ership claim. To the contrary, it should be the basis for legal reform to
better align the institution with its purpose.
In short, shareholders do not lack the control that would be ex-
pected of owners. Their rights are perfectly consistent with joint owner-
ship. Shareholders elect directors to run the business in their interests.
In doing so, they exercise their control rights indirectly. Little more
could be expected and nothing more could be demanded. Each individ-
ual shareholder cannot have the control rights of a sole proprietor.
However, shareholders collectively do.
C. Are Shareholders the Residual Claimants?
One of the main economic justifications often given for shareholder
primacy is that shareholders are the residual claimants.72 Because only
they bear the risk of every business decision-in terms of both the upside
and downside potential-they alone have the incentives to maximize
wealth. By comparison, fixed claimants will be too risk averse because
they will not share in additional profits.
73
Not everyone finds this justification persuasive. 4 For example, Pro-
fessor Lynn Stout has argued that "shareholders are only one of several
groups that can be described as 'residual claimants' or 'residual risk
bearers,' in the sense that they expect to enjoy benefits (and sometimes
to endure burdens) beyond those provided in their explicit contracts."75
Because she believes that shareholders are not the sole residual clai-
mants, she concludes that they do not deserve a privileged position in the
corporation.
76
The problem with Stout's argument lies in its capacious definition of
the term "residual claimant." She improperly defines it to include any-
one who expects to enjoy benefits and endure burdens beyond those
provided in their explicit contracts. This definition is too broad. 77  It
counts almost anything as a benefit or burden. For example, the possibil-
ity of raises and job security are considered relevant risks to the em-
72. See Stout, supra note 12, at 1192 ("[W]hile shareholders may not be the owners of the corpo-
ration, they are at least its sole residual claimants.").
73. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395,403-04 (1983).
74. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 23, 31
(1991) (describing residual claimant argument as "incomplete" because "[o]ther claimants face the
realistic prospect of tangible loss if decisions ... are not made with their interests in mind"). Macey's
concern is essentially about the vicinity of insolvency, where corporate decisions can affect creditors
with respect to their contractual rights. This is considered below.
75. Stout, supra note 12, at 1194.
76. See id. at 1208 ("[T]he argument that the shareholders 'own' the firm and the argument that
shareholders are the firm's sole residual claimants-are bad arguments.").
77. Ironically, Stout's definition is also too narrow in that it could actually exclude shareholders.
The shareholders' "explicit contract" entitles them to whatever profits there may be. There are no
benefits or burdens that can lie beyond such a claim. Thus, under her definition, shareholders should
not count as residual claimants.
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ployee under her approach. 78  Every stakeholder risks similar indirect
benefits and burdens depending upon the health of the company: for
creditors, in the risk of default; for customers, in the value of a warranty;
for local government, in tax receipts and local employment. Thus, every
claimant can be characterized as a residual claimant under Stout's analy-
sis. Essentially, Stout's claim is that everyone bears the risk that their
benefits will not match those promised by the corporation-whether be-
cause they exceed the promise or fall short. This is true-in fact, every-
one bears risk at all times with respect to almost everything-but it is not
the relevant consideration. Although everyone's claim is at risk, not eve-
ryone is a residual claimant. A residual claimant is one who is "en-
title[d] ... to whatever remains after the firm has met its explicit obliga-
tions and paid its fixed claims."79  Only shareholders meet this
definition °
Because shareholders are residual claimants, the corporation's prof-
its and losses affect their wealth directly. The marginal dollar of profit or
loss falls on them. Stout disagrees. She notes that, "as a legal matter,
shareholders of a public corporation are entitled to receive nothing from
the firm unless and until the board of directors decides that they should
receive it.""1 This observation is accurate but irrelevant because the cor-
poration's decision to pay dividends is itself largely irrelevant., If a
company retains its earnings instead of paying dividends, its stock price
will increase, and this will benefit the shareholders. Likewise, if a com-
pany loses money, its stock price will decrease, and this will harm the
shareholders.83 Shareholder wealth is not dependent upon dividends. In
fact, shareholders may prefer not to receive dividends for tax reasons. 1
78. See Stout, supra note 12, at 1194.
79. Id. at 1193 (citing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 36).
80. There are two exceptions. First, the shareholders could contractually share their residual
claim. Second, shareholders may no longer be claimants when the company is insolvent. This second
exception is considered below.
81. Stout, supra note 12, at 1194. Stout is correct in that shareholders have no right to dividends
until they are declared by the board of directors. See 11 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL.,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5321, at 563-66 (perm. ed., rev.
vol. 2003).
82. See Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of
Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411,412-15 (1961) (arguing irrelevance of dividend policy assuming perfect markets
and no taxes or transaction costs). See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 450-64 (9th ed. 2008).
83. Stout discounts this. According to her, "[t]hat benefit... is indirect, and dependent on the
board of directors' decisions. If the board decides to run the firm with an eye primarily to serving the
interests of its executives, employees, or customers-or if they simply run it into the ground-
shareholders' rights to sell their shares on the open market are of little value." Stout, supra note 12, at
1194. However, this argument is more relevant to the issue of control than of residual risk. The fact
remains that the shareholders bear the residual risk on all corporate actions; whether or not those cor-
porate actions are wise or even legitimate is beside the point.
84. Historically, dividends have been subject to double taxation at the ordinary tax rates. Capi-
tal gains are taxed only once and at a lower rate. In 2003, the tax rate on dividend income was lo-
wered, but dividends are still subject to double taxation. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconcilia-
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Thus, the contingency of dividend payments does not affect the status of
shareholders as residual claimants.
Professors Blair and Stout also find support for objection to the re-
sidual claimant argument for shareholder primacy in the empirical re-
search of Professor Lynn Lopucki. 5 Lopucki conducted a study of firms
in bankruptcy and concluded "that no identifiable, single residual owner
class exists in most reorganizing large public companies." 8 Blair and
Stout interpret this to mean that shareholders are not the lone residual
claimants? 7
Lopucki's work does not support this conclusion. He was studying
bankruptcy law, not corporate law. Ownership issues are complicated
by insolvency and bankruptcy, even under the traditional view. Ordina-
rily, shareholders hold the equity interest in the company and are its
owners. As a result, they are residual claimants. Upon insolvency, how-
ever, the value of the shareholders' equity interest may be zero or even
negative. 9 Under such circumstances, it is not clear that they can be con-
sidered (beneficial) owners. In bankruptcy (theoretically, at least), the
assets are distributed among creditors, who then become the owners.9
Lopucki's study was about the difficulties encountered in the administra-
tion of bankruptcy, before any final resolution. Because shareholders
are no longer equitable owners, someone is needed to take their place
controlling the business. The residual claimant, whoever it may be at
that point, would be a logical substitute. Lopucki found that it can be
very difficult to find a perfect substitute for shareholders in bankruptcy. 91
Lopucki's study does not conclude that there is no sole residual
claimant outside of bankruptcy. He merely found that, in bankruptcy,
the residual claim often is shared such that there is no single residual
claimant. 92 However, there could be a lone residual claimant, even in
bankruptcy. Indeed, his study found that in up to thirty-eight percent of
tion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 302, 117 Stat. 752, 760-64 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
85. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in
Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 728 (2006) ("[T]he law.., does not treat the shareholders of a cor-
poration that is not in bankruptcy as the corporation's sole 'residual claimants."'). "Nor is it clear
shareholders enjoy this status even when the firm is in bankruptcy." Id. at 728 n.23.
86. Lynn M. Lopucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
1341, 1343 (2004).
87. Blair & Stout, supra note 85, at 728 & n.23.
88. Lopucki, supra note 86, at 1341.
89. Because shareholders enjoy limited liability, a negative equity interest is effectively equal to
zero.
90. Cf. infra note 181 and accompanying text.
91. Lopucki, supra note 86, at 1343 ("[T]heories depending upon the existence of a single resi-
dual owner are unworkable. The problem is not merely that single residual owners are difficult to
identify. The problem is that they rarely exist.").
92. Id. at 1361 ("In at least 62% of large public company reorganizations, no identifiable single
residual owner exists. Instead, two or more groups with conflicting interests with respect to the firm's
investment policy share the marginal dollar of gain or loss.").
[Vol. 2010
SHAREHOLDER OWNERSHIP AND PRIMACY
the cases, there may have been a single residual claimant. 93 Whatever
implications Lopucki's work may have for shareholders' status during in-
solvency and bankruptcy, it does not challenge shareholder ownership
outside of bankruptcy. It is perfectly consistent with Lopucki's findings
that shareholders begin with the residual claim on assets but can trade it
away by contract and lose it in bankruptcy. All that this means is that the
shareholder's interest in the corporation is alienable-as is most proper-
ty.
In fairness, there is a legitimate objection to the residual claimant
argument: corporate statutes nowhere specifically provide that share-
holders are residual claimants. What they tend to provide is that share-
holders have the right to the net assets upon dissolution.94 However, dis-
solution may never occur. If the shareholders' claim is limited to a
liquidation right, then it is essentially meaningless.95 This is because the
directors could distribute corporate assets among the various constitu-
ents throughout the corporation's life, leaving little or nothing for share-
holders upon dissolution. Thus, it can be argued that shareholders do
not have any meaningful claim to the company's profits.96 However, a
residual claim is much more than a liquidation right. It is the right to the
remainder after all fixed claims are paid. It is not a one-time right; ra-
ther, it is a perpetual claim upon the net assets. The lack of a statutory
basis for a residual claim on the part of shareholders presents a problem
for contractarian theory. It does not present a similar problem for the
traditional view because a residual claim flows implicitly and necessarily
from ownership, rather than the other way around.
However, if shareholders are residual claimants, then they become
virtually indistinguishable from owners-at least as far as other stake-
holders are concerned. A perpetual claim on the net assets would pre-
vent the directors from doing as they please: they could not distribute
corporate assets to other stakeholders without infringing the rights of
shareholders. At all times, directors must either distribute the net assets
to shareholders in the form of dividends, or reinvest them for the benefit
93. See id. at 1360-61. In fairness, Lopucki qualifies this finding as follows:
[T]he study's methods provide a very conservative estimate of the number of investor priority le-
vels whose interests conflict with those of the firm.... [C]reditors [who] recovered the full
amounts owing them ... [welre not classified as residual owners....
The study's methods treat these creditors as having had no conflict with shareholders as to
the firm's investment policy, even though most probably did.... As a result, this study's finding
of single residual owners in 38% of reorganizing firms probably overestimates substantially.
Id. at 1361.
94. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281(a)-(b) (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 6.01(b)(2)
(2008).
95. Cf. Stout, supra note 12, at 1193 ("When the firm is not in bankruptcy, it is grossly misleading
to suggest that the firm's shareholders are somehow entitled to... everything left over after the firm's
explicit contractual obligations have been met.").
96. Cf. Pyle v. Gallaher, 75 A. 373, 375 (Del. 1908) (noting that defendant's assertion "that a
shareholder in a corporation has no property interest in the profits of the business carried on by the
corporation until a dividend has been declared out of such profits" is "substantially correct" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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of shareholders. 97 Thus, admitting that shareholders are residual clai-
mants presents a problem for communitarians, even if shareholder own-
ership is denied.
D. What About Options Theory?
Another theory that could call into question the shareholder's own-
ership of the corporation is the options theory of Professors Black and
Scholes. 98 Based on options theory, Professors Blair and Stout argue as
follows:
From the standpoint of the financial claims and risk being
borne by the two parties .... [i]t is equally sensible to describe ei-
ther the stockholder or the institutional bondholder as the firm's
true "owner", with the other party holding some sort of contingent
claim. Options theory destroys any notion that shareholders can be
uniquely described, in economic terms at least, as "owners" of cor-
porations.99
Essentially, the claim is that, because equity and debt interests are eco-
nomically equivalent, shareholders cannot be considered the owners of
the corporation.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that an expansive inter-
pretation of options theory would undermine the concept of ownership
altogether. To the extent that options theory suggests that
[o]nce a firm has issued debt ... it makes just as much sense to say
that the debtholders "own" ... the corporation[] ... but have sold a
call option to the shareholder, as it does to say that the shareholder
"owns" ... the corporation[]... but has bought a put option from
the debtholders, 100
it arguably also suggests that
[o]nce a [person] has [borrowed money].., it makes just as much
sense to say that the [lenders] "own" the [borrower's assets] but
have sold a call option to the [borrower], as it does to say that the
[borrower] "owns" the [assets] but has bought a put option from the
[lenders]. 101
97. Of course, reinvestment would mean entering into contracts with other stakeholders. Al-
though this might seem like a distribution, it is not. It is an exchange, which is entirely different.
98. See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabili-
ties, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
99. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the
Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403,412-13 (2001).
100. Stout, supra note 12, at 1192.
101. Id. Corporate debt is different than personal debt in that shareholders have limited liability
for corporate debt. However, it is not clear that this makes a difference. Setting aside special protec-
tions in bankruptcy law, individual debtors are in the same situation as corporate debtors: they must
either pay their debts or relinquish their assets, which are sold to satisfy those debts. In theory, indi-
vidual debtors face unlimited liability. However, in practice, bankruptcy can provide an individual
debtor with a fresh start.
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Because nearly everyone takes on at least some debt, no one could be
said to own anything. Thus, to embrace this interpretation of options
theory is to deny the concept of ownership. For some scholars, this may
not be a problem. However, for many scholars and most others, it would
be deeply problematic.
The exact claim made by Black and Scholes was technical and li-
mited: "Under [certain simplifying assumptions], it is clear that the
stockholders have the equivalent of an option on their company's assets.
In effect, the bond holders own the company's assets, but they have given
options to the stockholders to buy the assets back."' 1 However, the sim-
plifying assumptions adopted by Black and Scholes are unrealistic. Once
the assumptions are relaxed to conform to reality, the picture becomes
very different. Stock no longer resembles a simple option on the corpo-
ration's assets, but rather a very complicated series of options transac-
tions.103 At this point, the analogy falls apart. In the real world, it is not
fair to say that stock resembles an option on the assets. At most, one can
say only that theoretically it may be possible to create a series of options
transactions that would approximate the economic interest of stock. This
claim is not nearly as persuasive. While it may provide many interesting
insights into the nature of the various interests in a corporation, it does
not support the claim that shareholders do not own the corporation.
It is important to remember that options theory is a financial theory,
not a legal theory. It focuses on the economic interests of security hold-
ers and neglects their other interests in the corporation. But these other
interests, especially control rights, are valuable and cannot be ignored.
As a legal or practical matter, it makes no sense to say that "the bond
holders own the company's assets"" merely because options theory sug-
gests that their economic interests are, in some respects, similar to those
of shareholders. In fact, options theory does not establish equivalency
between equity and debt interests; it merely establishes a point of simi-
larity. Any argument to the contrary pushes options theory beyond its
limits. Black and Scholes sought to determine the price of various securi-
ties based on the prices of other securities.105 For this purpose, options
theory may be useful. However, the theory is not capable of determining
the legal rights of the various security holders.
Professors Mitu Gulati, William Klein, and Eric Zolt develop op-
tions theory in a more complex and comprehensive manner. 16 They con-
102. Black & Scholes, supra note 98, at 649-50.
103. See id. at 650-52. Even Black and Scholes admit that "these more complicated options can-
not be handled by using the valuation formula [set forth in the article].... [T]he formula cannot be
used, even as an approximation, to give the value of an option on an option." Id. at 652. However,
they did maintain hope "that an analysis in the same spirit... would allow at least a numerical solu-
tion to the valuation of certain more complicated options." Id.
104. Id. at 649.
105. Id. at 640-44.
106. See Gulati et al., supra note 26, at 908-18.
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struct an intricate model that "invites attention to the question of how to
allocate control among the individual participants."'17 However, in doing
so, they do not purport to describe existing corporate law on the issue of
ownership. To the contrary, they readily acknowledge that "present-day
U.S. corporate law.... conceives that equity is the owner and that the
single duty of the firm and its agents is to maximize shareholder
wealth."'0 To be fair, they do "attempt to demonstrate how the concept
of ownership loses much of its usefulness and why there is no natural al-
location of control to equity investors" when "a different perspective on
joint economic activity" is employed.1°a Ultimately, however, "[their]
point is that a different perspective-a nonhierarchical, nonfirm one-
can add new insights.""10 In other words, they do not claim to present a
descriptively accurate account of existing law, but rather a model for how
the corporation can, and perhaps should, be viewed.
E. What About the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory?
The greatest challenge to the traditional view comes not from any
legal argument, but from a competing theory of the firm. As we have
seen, specific legal arguments fall short of disproving shareholder owner-
ship. Where those arguments fail, however, an entirely new perspective
may be more successful. The law and economics movement's nexus-of-
contracts theory"' paints a picture of the corporation that is both cohe-
rent and plausible, and thus presents a viable alternative to the tradition-
al view.
The contractarian theory has managed to capture the attention of
most contemporary academics. This is not surprising. It is a powerful
tool for analyzing corporations and corporate law. It is extremely in-
sightful, highlighting aspects of corporate law that otherwise might be
overlooked or underappreciated by traditional theorists, including the
advantages of enabling laws over mandatory ones, the importance of ap-
propriate default rules coupled with flexibility, and the market for corpo-
rate control. It is also appealing because it emphasizes neutral prin-
ciples-efficiency and wealth maximization.12  Even a traditionalist
would have to admit that the nexus-of-contracts theory has made many
valuable contributions to corporate law.
However, the relevant issue for present purposes is descriptive
accuracy. A theory may be helpful in many respects without being
107. Id. at 916.
108. Id. at 907.
109. Id. at 894.
110. Id. at 945.
111. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
112. Not everyone agrees that these are neutral principles. See, e.g., DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN
A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 17 (1992).
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technically correct in every particular."3 Both the traditional view and
the nexus-of-contracts theory are coherent and plausible, but they are
inconsistent with each other on the issue of shareholder ownership and
cannot both be correct.114 In this Section, I try to point out some of the
descriptive limits of contractarian theory.
As an initial matter, the concept "nexus of contracts" is quite vague.
One dictionary defines nexus as "[a] bond or link; a means of
conne[ct]ion between things or parts."'1 5 Another defines the term as
"center" or "focus."1 6 Under these definitions, the phrase nexus of con-
tracts could describe markets as well as firms. In fact, some contracta-
rians would argue that there are no differences between markets and
firms." 7 This has led Professor Melvin Eisenberg to conclude that "at
bottom the nexus-of-contracts conception is not a theory of the firm: [iut
is a theory of why there are no firms.""' 8 However, many contractarians
do appreciate the difference between markets and firms. 119 Thus, I would
argue only that, because the concept of a nexus of contracts can encom-
pass both markets and firms, it risks simplifying the firm and overlooking
important aspects of the corporation.
More importantly, although it may be technically accurate to de-
scribe a corporation as a nexus of contracts, it is entirely inadequate. As
a constitutive matter, there is more to a corporation than just contracts.
For example, there is law. There is also hierarchical structure.2 ° Argua-
113. Cf STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 2-3 (2008).
[A] model is properly judged by its predictive power with respect to the phenomena it pur-
ports to explain, not by whether it is a valid description of an objective reality. As such, "the re-
levant question to ask about the 'assumptions' of a theory is not whether they are descriptively
,realistic,' for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the pur-
pose at hand."
Id. (citation omitted).
114. But see infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
115. X THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 382 (2d ed. 1989).
116. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 783 (10th ed. 2003) (quoting the third de-
finition provided).
117. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 777 (1972) ("The firm... has no power.., any different
in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting .... To speak of managing... is a deceptive
way of noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of contracts on terms that
must be acceptable to both parties."); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976)
("Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are 'inside' the
firm (or any other organization) from those things that are 'outside' of it. There is in a very real sense
only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) .... 1.
118. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the
Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819,832 (1999).
119. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 554-59; R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA (N.S.) 386 (1937).
120. See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 555 ("[Tlhe defining characteristic of a firm is the existence
of a central decisionmaker vested with the power of fiat."); Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 829 ("[T]he
corporation has a dual nature.... [It] can be described and understood either as a set of reciprocal
arrangements or as a bureaucratic hierarchical organization.").
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bly, there are noncontractual relationships as well.' Thus, it is descrip-
tively wrong to say that the corporation is reducible to contracts.
Nevertheless, contractarians insist that the claim is essentially cor-
rect. For example, they would argue that their definition of "contract" is
broad enough to include the relationships and hierarchy found in a cor-
poration.22  If so, one may reasonably question the appropriateness of
the term "contract. 123 In any event, law is a different matter. Here, con-
tractarians argue that corporate law is irrelevant because it is largely a
matter of default rules, from which the parties may depart if they
choose."' If corporate law is not binding, then it seems reasonable to say
that it resembles contract rather than law. However, corporate law is not
so simple. Some of its provisions are mandatory; this fact can be trivia-
lized, but not denied.2 5 Moreover, non-mandatory rules come in differ-
ent forms. Some are fairly described as default rules. Director control
over the business and affairs of the corporation may be one example.'26
However, others are enabling laws. An example would be a merger sta-
tute.127  Such a law simultaneously authorizes a type of transaction that
otherwise would not be legal and sets forth mandatory rules for its ac-
complishment. Although it facilitates contract, an enabling law itself
cannot be characterized as contractual. In short, there is more to the
corporation than just contract, however broadly defined.
A contractarian might reject this argument by insisting that the ben-
efits of incorporation can be recreated entirely by contract, without the
assistance of corporate law.' s However, it is difficult to maintain that a
121. The significance of mere relationships is debatable. Communitarians would consider these
relationships to be more significant than would traditionalists or contractarians. See infra Section II.F.
122. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 28 (2002) ("As used by
contractarians... the term [contract] is not limited to those relationships that constitute legal con-
tracts.").
123. See Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 822-23 ("[W]hy is the term contracts, rather than the term
reciprocal arrangements, used in the nexus-of-contracts conception? ... [B]ecause it carries connota-
tions that nexus-of-contracts theorists find normatively or strategically appealing.").
. 124. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 543 (1990); Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case
for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1599 (1989).
125. According to Bainbridge, "most contractarians probably regard the normative story as being
the more important .... As such, we cheerfully concede the existence of mandatory rules, while dep-
loring that unfortunate fact." BAINBRIDGE, supra note 122, at 32; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 6, at 3 ("Any theory of corporate law must account for the mandatory as well as the enabl-
ing features ....").
126. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of every corpora-
tion.., shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided ... in its certificate of incorporation."). Or perhaps not. Cf. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 8.01(b) cmt., at 8-4-8-5 (2009) ("If a corporation does not have a shareholders agreement that
satisfies the requirements of section 7.32, or if it is a public corporation, it must adopt the traditional
board of directors as its governing body."). But if not, then it establishes that there are, in fact, man-
datory rules.
127. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251.
128. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 34-35; William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus
of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 444-45 (1989); cf Paul G.
Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873,
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corporation can be perfectly replicated by contract. At the very least, it
would be impossible to create limited liability'1 9 vis-h-vis third-party tort
claimants: tort victims cannot-and almost certainly would not-grant
shareholders limited liability in advance. 13° Other benefits of incorpora-
tion also might be recreated by contract more easily in theory than in
practice. 1' But even if they could be replicated by contract, the fact re-
mains that existing corporations are not merely creatures of contract.
In addition, as a theory of the firm, the nexus-of-contracts model
proves too much. Although its proponents generally focus on large pub-
lic corporations, the theory logically applies equally well to other forms
of business. 132  Smaller corporations, closely held corporations, limited
liability companies, partnerships, even sole proprietorships-all of them
fall within the description, nexus of contracts. In each case, various
stakeholders invest assets in the business with the expectation of some
return. Equity holders-whether shareholders, members, partners, or
sole proprietors -invest capital in exchange for the residual return; debt
holders invest capital in exchange for a fixed return; employees invest la-
bor in exchange for fixed salaries; customers invest revenue in exchange
for products or services. In short, if contractarians are correct, then
every business must be nothing more than a nexus of contracts. As a re-
sult, the theory which seemed so plausible with respect to public corpora-
tions becomes much less convincing.
892-93 (2000) ("The benefits of treating a business as something separate from its owners are so ob-
vious and overwhelming that it has never required substantial governmental assistance to achieve.").
129. The issue of limited liability deserves additional attention. At first glance, it may seem to
cause problems for the traditional view. After all, owners generally are held liable for the obligations
of their businesses and others are not. This is true for sole proprietorships and partnerships, so it
might seem that shareholders should not be considered owners. In fact, however, shareholders would
be held liable but for the special protection of the doctrine of limited liability. Under certain circums-
tances, courts in equity will "pierce the corporate veil" to hold shareholders liable for the obligations
of the corporation. GEVURTZ, supra note 44, § 1.5, at 69-111. This makes sense only if shareholders
are owners. If they truly were just like other stakeholders, they should not face personal liability any
more than others do. Cf. Gulati et al., supra note 26, at 930 ("[Ilt is interesting and surprising that no
one seems to have considered the possibility of applying the arguments for shareholder personal liabil-
ity to other participants .... [If] there are no clear boundaries and no owners.., the scope of poten-
tially liable persons might be virtually infinite."). Thus, the existence of the exceptional doctrines of
limited liability and piercing the corporate veil actually provide support for the claim of shareholder
ownership.
130. See Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Sta-
tutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (1998) ("Even if the owners of the firm were able
to overcome the transaction costs of negotiating with their contract creditors one-on-one for limited
liability, it would be impossible for them to so negotiate with future tort creditors." (footnote omit-
ted)). Contractarians may find justifying the rule of limited liability quite easy, see BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 122, at 138-45, but that does not change the fact that the rule is not contractual in any meaningful
sense.
131. At the very least, investors are more likely to be comfortable with the corporate form than
with a purely contractual enterprise that they must trust has replicated a corporation adequately.
132. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 117, at 310-11 ("[Miost organizations are simply legal
fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.... The private
corporation or firm is simply one form .. " (emphasis omitted)).
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Contractarians believe that, because it is a nexus of contracts, the
corporation is not a thing capable of being owned. "' This claim was con-
sidered in a previous Section and found to be unpersuasive as a stand-
alone argument.'3 4 Its reliance on the nexus-of-contracts theory only
complicates matters: if a nexus of contracts is not capable of being
owned, and every business is a nexus of contracts, then no business is ca-
pable of being owned-not even a sole proprietorship. This is clearly
wrong. Thus, we may conclude that the contractarian claim about corpo-
rate ownership is wrong (or at least unfounded).
Professor Bainbridge's director primacy theory adds a slight wrinkle
to the nexus-of-contracts theory. He argues that a corporation has, ra-
ther than is, a nexus of contracts, and that the nexus is the board of direc-
tors.'35 This is because the board of directors has the power to manage
the corporation and is the group that interacts with all other groups.
Thus, Bainbridge puts the board of directors in the center of his corpo-
rate diagram:'36
133. See supra Part II.A.
134. See supra Part II.A.
135. See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 554-60.
136. See id. at 560 fig.3.
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This diagram makes his claim seem obvious. However, the share-
holders' right to elect directors and the directors' fiduciary duties to
manage the corporation in the interests of shareholders suggest that it is
misleading to consider the board of directors to be the corporate nexus.
The traditional view holds that the shareholders are the focus of the cor-
poration.
The problem with Bainbridge's diagram is that it lumps sharehold-
ers together with other stakeholders. A more precise corporate diagram
would reflect the fact that shareholders elect directors to contract with
other stakeholders on their behalf:
In this revised diagram, directors may remain at the center, but they
are certainly not the focus. Rather, they act as the bridge between
shareholders and other stakeholders. This diagram, which better reflects
corporate law, points to the shareholder as the true focus of the corpora-
tion.
Contractarians are unlikely to be impressed by the discussion in this
Section, or any earlier Section of this Article. According to Bainbridge,
"the debate [over the contractual nature of the firm] has been fully
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played out. Contractarians and noncontractarians no longer have much
of interest to say to one another; indeed, they barely speak the same lan-
guage." 7 I tend to agree with his assessment. However, I believe that
the difference between the two theories is largely a matter of semantics.
Under the traditional view, the corporation is a separate entity owned by
the shareholders that transacts business with others. Under the nexus-of-
contracts theory, by contrast, the corporation is the entire business en-
terprise, including all stakeholder interests. Clearly, the two theories are
not discussing the same concept. Thus, both theories can be correct on
their own terms: shareholders own what the traditional view considers a
corporation, but not what the contractarian theory considers a corpora-
tion.138 In fact, the two theories do not disagree about ownership of any
particular component of the business: they both acknowledge that share-
holders have the rights provided by law and those set forth in the char-
ter-including the right to vote for directors, the residual claim on assets,
and the right to the loyalty of directors in pursuing shareholder wealth-
and that shareholders have no claim to the inputs of other stakeholders,
such as the employees' labor. Thus, the traditionalist and the contracta-
rian are not exactly disagreeing on the issue of shareholder ownership;
they are speaking past each other.
Nevertheless, it is important to insist upon the traditional view for at
least two reasons. First, the legal definition of the term corporation is
consistent with the traditional view. Thus, even though contractarian
theory may be correct when properly understood, its conclusions cannot
be imported directly into other conversations without translation.
Shareholders may not own what contractarians call a corporation, but
they do own what nearly everyone else-including, as I hope to show in
Part III, the law-calls a corporation. Second, the conclusion that share-
holders do not own the corporation can be problematic. Although con-
tractarians do a commendable job in defending the norm of shareholder
wealth maximization with arguments of economic efficiency, their con-
clusions are not inexorable. As we shall see, if shareholders do not own
the corporation, then the norm of shareholder wealth maximization is
subject to challenge. Thus, the stability of corporate law and the very
purpose of corporations may depend upon shareholder ownership.
F. What About Stakeholders?
Many corporate law scholars are more concerned about the rights of
other stakeholders than those of shareholders. Their problem with the
traditional view is that it singles out the shareholder as the sole concern
of the corporation. In their view, the corporation is an institution that
should benefit all of society. Therefore, they reject shareholder wealth
137. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 122, at 31.
138. Contra supra text accompanying note 114.
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maximization as the goal of the corporation. As I have elsewhere, I refer
to these scholars collectively as social responsibility theorists.
139
Historically, social responsibility theorists have accepted the basic
framework of the traditional view and merely sought to impose a level of
corporate social responsibility on directors.'" More recently, however,
they have come to question claims of shareholder ownership. Contem-
porary social responsibility theorists are often referred to as communita-
rians.'4 ' "Communitarians generally accept [the contractarian] descrip-
tion of the firm. However, they do not accept the structure of
shareholder primacy that contractarians tend to build on this founda-
tion."'42 They agree with contractarians that shareholders do not own the
corporation. However, they believe that the contractarian focus on ex-
plicit contracts ignores important implicit contracts and relational inter-
ests. Thus, communitarians would characterize the corporation not as a
nexus of contracts, but as a community, or a nexus of relationships.
43
This leads them to a very different conclusion about the purpose of the
corporation: "the corporation must be run consciously in the interests of
society as a whole."'14
Given the premise that the corporation is an unownable nexus, the
communitarian's conclusions are at least as plausible as the contracta-
rian's. If shareholders do not own the corporation, it is not obvious why
the corporation should be run solely in their interests. Thus, the com-
munitarian theory of the firm cannot be dismissed easily.
Because it shares the same basic premises, communitarian theory is
subject to the same types of criticism as contractarian theory. 145 For ex-
ample, the concept of a nexus of relationships is even more vague than a
nexus of contracts. Almost any human endeavor could be described as a
nexus of relationships. In addition, a corporation is more than just a
nexus of relationships. As previously discussed, it also involves law.
Some of these laws protect stakeholders, 1'" while others protect share-
holders.147 All of them should be respected. Moreover, not all relation-
ships are of equal significance, legally or otherwise. Thus, to say that re-
lationships are involved is not terribly helpful. Finally, like nexus-of-
contracts theory, it simply proves too much. If a nexus of relationships is
139. See Velasco, supra note 2, at 451-52.
140. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REv. 1145, 1155-56 (1932).
141. See Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 667,674-76 (2002). See generally sources cited supra note 9.
142. Velasco, supra note 2, at 456.
143. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 5, at 10.
144. Velasco, supra note 2, at 456 (citing Greenfield, supra note 9, at 89).
145. See supra Part II.E.
146. Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REv. 121, 146-47
(1991).
147. William S. Hochstetler & Mark D. Svejda, Statutory Needs of Close Corporations-An Em-
pirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?, 10 J. CORP.
L. 849, 1006-10 (1985).
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beyond ownership, then it is not merely business organizations that are at
risk, but the concept of property itself. There are always relationships
surrounding property as well as third parties who may be affected greatly
by the decisions of property owners, but neither fact automatically con-
veys ownership interests or property rights under the law. Thus, while
the nexus-of-relationships concept can be a helpful framework for disco-
vering different dimensions of the corporation, especially when it sup-
plements nexus-of-contracts theory, it is not well suited to legal analysis.
On the issue of ownership, communitarians do not stand on solid
ground. As I have sought to establish throughout this Part, legal argu-
ments fail to establish that shareholders are not owners. It would be
even more difficult to establish that other stakeholders are co-owners:
148
they simply do not have any of the incidents of ownership, nor any legal
claim to them. At most, it could only be argued that they deserve to be
considered co-owners- and that would be a very debatable position.
Ultimately, the central issue for social responsibility theorists is not
shareholder ownership, but stakeholder rights. However, there are many
ways that the law can protect the latter without disrupting the former.
For example, employees can be protected by minimum wage, collective
bargaining, and workplace safety legislation. Lenders can be protected
by security interests and fraudulent transfer laws. Consumers can be
protected by implied warranties, safety standards, and products liability.
Communities can be protected by land use regulation, taxation, and oth-
er general laws. In fact, current law provides protections along each of
these lines. If these laws are insufficient, they can be enhanced or sup-
plemented with additional protections. Thus, a denial of shareholder
ownership would be an extreme and unnecessary solution to the prob-
lems identified by social responsibility theorists.
Social responsibility theorists do not always emphasize ownership
issues. Often, they argue that the directors owe their fiduciary duties to
the corporation as a separate legal entity rather than to the sharehold-
ers.149 This argument has some merit, but it does not accomplish what its
proponents would like it to.
One reason the argument fails is because it does, in fact, depend
upon denial of shareholder ownership. If the corporation is to be treated
as a separate entity, then it makes sense to have directors pursue the in-
terests of the corporation rather than those of its shareholders. Howev-
er, the corporation is distinct not only from its shareholders, but also
from its other stakeholders. Thus, the corporation should not seek to
balance the interests of the various stakeholders, 150 but rather should pur-
sue its own interests by maximizing its own wealth. In other words, it
should act as a separate entity -a sole proprietorship. However, because
148. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 293-94; Dodd, supra note 140, at 1160-61.
150. Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 253.
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shareholders own that entity, the wealth generated by the corporation
redounds to their benefit.'51 As previously discussed, this is true regard-
less of whether the wealth is distributed in the form of dividends.'52 In
order to reach a different conclusion, social responsibility theorists must
assume (at least implicitly) that shareholders are not owners and ignore
their residual claim. If no one has a right to the wealth amassed by the
corporation, then it would seem entirely reasonable to share it among the
various participants in the corporate enterprise. But if shareholders are
owners, or even merely residual claimants, then the corporate wealth be-
longs to them.53
Another reason the argument fails is that directors do owe their fi-
duciary duties to the shareholders. In fact, the most common formula-
tion used by the courts is that directors owe their fiduciary duties to "the
corporation and its shareholders." '54 The conclusion that fiduciary duties
are owed to the corporation as a separate entity is entirely logical and
makes sense as a matter of law. In fact, the courts have said so explicitly:
"It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corpora-
tion."'55 However, fiduciary duties are a matter of equity, which is con-
cerned more with substance and fairness than form and technicalities.'56
Thus, courts in equity recognize that fiduciary duties that are owed to the
corporation redound to the benefit of shareholders and therefore allow
151. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del.
2007) (describing shareholders as "the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation's growth and increased
value").
152. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). I believe that
this language suggests an equivalence between the corporation and its shareholders, which makes
sense only under the traditional view. On its face, the statement is ambiguous. In context, however, it
is less ambiguous:
[T]he equivalence of "corporation" and "shareholders" ... is most clearly seen in the manner in
which courts and writers have used these terms, and that usage tends to show that they use them
as equivalents. In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court, in the course of two pages, described the
directors' "fundamental duty and obligation" as running first to "the corporate enterprise, which
includes stockholders," later to "the corporation and its shareholders," and finally, to just "the
corporation's stockholders."
A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years
Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 48-49 (1991) (citations omitted). There are other presumably equiva-
lent formulations as well, including simply "to the corporation" and to "the corporation for the benefit
of its shareholder owners." Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101.
Some might argue to the contrary. For example, they might point out that one of the Unocal court's
formulations was "the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders." 493 A.2d at 954. This is
ambiguous in that it could mean that the corporation includes shareholders as well as other stakehold-
ers. Whether or not that would be a reasonable interpretation of the formulation standing alone, it is
not a reasonable interpretation of the formulation in the context of that opinion and the other formu-
lations. The best interpretation is that fiduciary duties are owed not only to the corporation as a sepa-
rate entity, but also to the shareholders as owners and ultimate beneficiaries.
155. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101.
156. See Uni-Marts, Inc. v. Stein, Civ. A. Nos. 14713,14893,1996 WL 466961, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug.
12, 1996) ("[Tlhe essential fiduciary analysis component of corporation law is not formal but substan-
tive...."); Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1011 (Del. Ch. 1987) ("[O]ur law is the polar opposite of
technical and literal when the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors are involved.").
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shareholders to enforce them. The courts have been explicit on this as
well: "When a corporation is solvent, those duties may be enforced by its
shareholders, who have standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of
the corporation because they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corpo-
ration's growth and increased value.1157 So it is difficult to maintain that
directors do not, in fact, owe their fiduciary duties to the shareholders. 5 8
At the heart of social responsibility theory lies an attempt to instill a
greater sense of morality in directors and shareholders. This goal is rea-
sonable enough-perhaps even noble.159 However, it is ultimately aspira-
tional. "To be a meaningful concept, social responsibility must extend
beyond legal requirements -and thus, by definition, cannot be legally en-
forceable. Social responsibility, then, is more of an exhortation than a
command."'16 Even so, the concept of social responsibility cannot rea-
sonably demand that shareholders should put the welfare of others be-
fore their own. Shareholders should be able to prosper and profit from
their investments just as they should not prevent others from doing the
same. In other words, shareholders should be reasonable but need not
be self-sacrificing or charitable. They certainly need not surrender their
rights as owners.
Social responsibility theory reminds us that there are many stake-
holders that are affected by corporate decisions. However, this is equally
true of all property: third parties are affected by the decisions of owners.
This is not a sufficient basis for denying ownership to some or extending
it to others. At most, it is a basis for regulating what owners are permit-
ted to do with their assets.
III. THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE
In Part II, I addressed the arguments that form the core of the con-
temporary critique of the traditional view. I showed that these argu-
ments fall short of establishing that shareholders are not owners. In this
Part, I evaluate additional arguments often leveled against the traditional
view in order to develop an affirmative case for shareholder ownership.
First, I demonstrate that the law expressly provides that shareholders
own the corporation. On one important level, this should settle the ques-
tion. Then I argue that shareholders in public corporations are as much
owners as are the equity holders of other forms of business. Finally, I
address the claim that shareholders do not consider themselves owners. I
157. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101.
158. Communitarians often raise the existence of constituency statutes in support of their claim
that shareholders are not the sole subject of directors' fiduciary duties. However, constituency statutes
do not support their claims. As I have argued elsewhere, granting directors a limited ability to take
other stakeholders' interests into consideration is not the same as extending the protections of fidu-
ciary duties to those stakeholders. See Velasco, supra note 2, at 462-66.
159. But see Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine- The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAC., Sep. 13, 1970, at 32, 124-26.
160. Velasco, supra note 2, at 454 (citation omitted).
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hope to establish that the traditional view of the corporation remains a
viable position.
A. What Do Shareholders Own?
There are some who maintain that the traditional view has no basis
in law. For example, Martin Lipton has argued as follows:
Shareholders do not "own" corporations. They own securities-
shares of stock-which entitle them to very limited electoral rights
and the right to share in the financial returns produced by the cor-
poration's business operations. Conceiving of public shareholders
as "owners" may in some instances be a helpful metaphor, but it is
never an accurate description of their rights under corporate law.16'
The first question to be considered, then, is the most simple: what do
shareholders own? More precisely, I try to answer the question, what
does the law say that shareholders own?
Of course, it is true that shareholders own shares of stock. Howev-
er, this does not mean that they do not own the corporation as well.
Whether or not they do depends upon what shares of stock are. Lipton's
position assumes that they are merely contracts, like debt securities. If
so, it makes sense to think of the shareholder simply as having certain fi-
nancial and control rights against the corporation. The traditionalist,
however, insists that a share of stock is akin to a deed that represents
title. If so, it makes sense to say that the shareholders own the corpora-
tion. What does the law say?
Most states have adopted the Model Business Corporation Act.'62
Under its provisions, the answer is strikingly simple. "Shares" are expli-
citly defined as "the units into which the proprietary interests in a corpo-
ration are divided."'63 "Proprietary" is not defined by statute, but the
dictionary meaning of the term is "[b]elonging to a proprietor or proprie-
tors; owned or held as property; held in private ownership."'16 This is a
clear statement that shareholders are indeed the legal owners of the cor-
poration.
Unfortunately, the matter is not settled so easily. This is because
the single most important state for corporate law purposes is Delaware.
The Delaware General Corporation Law does not define the term stock
or otherwise say what it represents.65 Thus, the Delaware General Cor-
161. Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733,
754 (2007); see also Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company's Proxy:
An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. LAW. 67, 72-73 (2003); Stout, supra note 12, at 1191.
162. See 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. ix & nn.1-2 (2009).
163. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 1.40(22) (2008); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 184 (West 1990).
164. XII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICFIONARY 655 (2d ed. 1989).
165. Arguably, the closest that the Delaware code comes to a definition is the provision that each
class of stock shall have such rights as are specified in the charter. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a)
(2001). This does not sound like an ownership interest; to the contrary, it sounds more like a contrac-
tual investment. One may be tempted to read this provision as if it allowed a corporation to sell
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poration Law does not provide explicitly that shareholders own the cor-
poration. However, it does not state explicitly that they do not, either.
The Delaware statute is simply silent on the issue of ownership.166 Thus,
we must turn to other sources of law to determine what shareholders
own.
Admittedly, it is difficult to find very much case law directly ad-
dressing the issue of ownership. However, there is a great deal of case
law that implicitly reaffirms the traditional view. For example, as dis-
cussed earlier, Delaware courts generally insist that the directors of a
corporation owe their fiduciary duties "to the corporation and its share-
holders."167 Unfortunately, most of the courts' statements on fiduciary
duties are ambiguous. While they do support the traditional view, they
also can be interpreted consistently with other theories.
However, a few lines of cases are more helpful. For example, the
Delaware Supreme Court has permitted directors to consider the inter-
ests of other stakeholders, but only if "there are rationally related bene-
fits accruing to the stockholders."' 6  This undermines communitarian
theory because it makes clear that, in the final analysis, shareholders
must be the primary concern of the directors. Another example can be
found in cases involving director interference with shareholder voting.
In such cases, the courts have required compelling justification on the
grounds that "[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning
upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests. ' 169  Such a state-
ment makes perfect sense under the traditional view: it is a reminder that
shareholders securities with whatever rights it may choose to give them. However, this would be inap-
propriate. The Model Business Corporation Act, which already defines shares as representing owner-
ship interests, contains a similar provision. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.01(a). Thus, the provision
is neither a definition nor incompatible with ownership. To the contrary, it merely gives shareholders
the flexibility to differentiate among themselves by establishing different classes of stock. This is pre-
ferable to requiring uniform rights, regardless of the circumstances.
166. Interestingly, section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law defines the term "sub-
sidiary" as follows: "any entity directly or indirectly owned, in whole or in part, by the corporation of
which the stockholder is a stockholder.., and includes, without limitation, corporations, partnerships,
limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited liability companies, statutory trusts and/or
joint ventures." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(a)(3) (Supp. 2008). This language clearly assumes that
shareholders are owners because the parent corporation is said to own the subsidiary, in whole or in
part. Unfortunately, the language quoted above is only a definition for purposes of section 220, not
the entire act. However, it provides support for the claim that the shareholder's ownership interest is
implicit in the Delaware General Corporation Law.
167. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
168. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (cita-
tions omitted). More specifically:
A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided
there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders. However, such concern for
non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress,
and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the
highest bidder.
Id. at 182 (citation omitted).
169. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also MM Cos. v.
Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) (quoting Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659); Centaur Part-
ners, IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 927 (Del. 1990).
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directors have authority to run the business only because the owners
have appointed them. But it undermines contractarian theory under
which the only ideological underpinning is contract. Shareholder voting
may be desirable as a policy matter, but is not theoretically necessary. Of
course, one must be careful not to read too much into such statements.
However, my point is this: the law of fiduciary duties in Delaware reflects
the traditional view. It may be consistent with other theories in some re-
spects, but the fit is much less comfortable.
There also are various cases in which the Delaware Supreme Court
has referred to shareholders as owners. For example, in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Corp., the Court generally spoke of "the corporation
and its shareholders.' 170 However, in one instance, the court instead re-
ferred to "the corporation and its owners.' 1 71 This formulation has been
used in other cases as well. 172 Again, one must be careful not to read too
much into statements made in passing. However, such a slip would not
be likely to occur if courts agreed that corporations were not capable of
being owned.
Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly grounded
shareholder inspection rights on the principle of ownership. For exam-
ple, in Seinfeld v. Verizon Communications, Inc., the court explained:
Delaware corporate law provides for a separation of legal con-
trol and ownership. The legal responsibility to manage the business
of the corporation for the benefit of the stockholder owners is con-
ferred on the board of directors by statute. The common law im-
poses fiduciary duties upon the directors of Delaware corporations
to constrain their conduct when discharging that statutory responsi-
bility.
Stockholders' rights to inspect the corporation's books and
records were recognized at common law because as a matter of self-
protection, the stockholder was entitled to know how his agents
were conducting the affairs of the corporation of which he or she
was a part owner. The qualified inspection rights that originated at
common law are now codified .... "I
This type of statement is not exactly made in passing. It certainly
provides support for the traditional view. Nevertheless, such statements
are not exactly determinative.
However, in at least one case, the Delaware Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly recognized that shareholders are the owners of the corporation.
In North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc.
170. 493 A.2d 946, 952, 954 (Del. 1985); see also id. at 958.
171. See id. at 955.
172. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 176-77 n.5 (Del. 1980); Ruggiero v. Futu-
raGene, P.L.C., 948 A.2d 1124, 1133 (Del. Ch. 2008); Grand Metro. P.L.C. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d
1049, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1988).
173. 909 A.2d 117, 119 (Del. 2006) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 116 (Del. 2002).
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v. Gheewalla, NACEPF, a creditor of Clearwire Holdings, Inc., sought
to bring a direct action against the company's directors for breach of fi-
duciary duty.174 The plaintiff argued that "because, at all relevant times,
Clearwire was either insolvent or in the 'zone of insolvency,' the Defen-
dants owed fiduciary duties to NACEPF 'as a substantial creditor of
Clearwire, '1" and that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by
"favor[ing] [the shareholders'] agenda."'76 The court's holding was that
"individual creditors of an insolvent corporation have no right to assert
direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against corporate directors."'77
However, in the course of its opinion, the court provided a clear account
of the traditional view: "Delaware corporate law provides for a separa-
tion of control and ownership. The directors of Delaware corporations
have 'the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for
the benefit of its shareholders [sic] owners. ' 1
78
Closer examination of the court's opinion reveals that this state-
ment was not errant dictum. The plaintiff relied on the principle that
"where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of
directors is not merely the agent of the [shareholders], but owes its duty
to the corporate enterprise."'79 The Delaware Supreme Court responded
by clarifying the nature of fiduciary duties:
It is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary ob-
ligations to the corporation and its shareholders.... Accordingly,
the general rule is that directors do not owe creditors duties beyond
the relevant contractual terms.
... When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of in-
solvency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change: direc-
tors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corpo-
ration and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in
the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its sharehold-
er owners.1
80
In other words, shareholders are owners and directors must run the cor-
poration for their benefit, even when in the "zone of insolvency."
The court did permit the creditors of a corporation that actually is
insolvent to pursue a breach of fiduciary duty claim in a derivative action,
as opposed to a direct action. However, it did so for reasons entirely
consistent with the traditional view:
174. 930 A.2d 92, 94-95 (Del. 2007). For another instance, see also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5,
7 (Del. 1988).
175. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 95.
176. Id. at 93.
177. Id. at 103.
178. Id. at 101 (footnote omitted) (quoting Malone, 722 A.3d at 9).
179. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991
WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,1991).
180. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 99-101 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the cor-
poration. When a corporation is solvent, those duties may be en-
forced by its shareholders, who have standing to bring derivative ac-
tions on behalf of the corporation because they are the ultimate
beneficiaries of the corporation's growth and increased value.
When a corporation is insolvent, however, its creditors take the
place of the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of any in-
crease in value.
Consequently, the creditors of an insolvent corporation have
standing to maintain derivative claims against directors on behalf of
the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties. The corporation's
insolvency makes the creditors the principal constituency injured by
any fiduciary breaches that diminish the firm's value. Therefore,
equitable considerations give creditors standing to pursue deriva-
tive claims against the directors of an insolvent corporation. Indi-
vidual creditors of an insolvent corporation have the same incentive
to pursue valid derivative claims on its behalf that shareholders
have when the corporation is solvent.
The fact that the corporation has become insolvent does not turn
[derivative] claims into direct creditor claims, it simply provides
creditors with standing to assert those claims. At all times, claims
of this kind belong to the corporation itself .... "I
In other words, given the independent legal status of the corporation, di-
rectors technically owe their fiduciary duties to it. In reality, this duty
runs to the beneficial owners, which ordinarily are the shareholders.
However, when the company is insolvent, shareholders have no equity in
the company and creditors effectively become the beneficial owners.
This is entirely consistent with the traditional view.
Gheewalla is a recent case decided by the Delaware Supreme Court
which does as much to uphold the traditional view of the corporation as
reasonably can be expected of a court decision. 2 It is admittedly diffi-
cult to find many cases directly on point. However, because the corpora-
tion legally is an entity that is separate and distinct from its shareholders,
it is not very often that the courts have to opine on the issue of owner-
ship directly. Thus, the lack of abundant case law support should not be
surprising.
181. Id. at 101-02 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted).
182. The most well-known case that endorses the traditional view is probably Dodge v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 170 NW. 668 (Mich. 1919). Technically, that case addresses the purpose of corporations ra-
ther than ownership issues. Moreover, the discussion in that case has been criticized as mere dictum.
See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 163, 168
(2008). Presumably, the same type of arguments could be leveled against Gheewalla or any similar
case. However, at least in Gheewalla, shareholder ownership both is explicit and provides the ratio-
nale for the court's holding.
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In summary, the claim that shareholders own only shares of stock in
corporations and not the corporations themselves seems to be descrip-
tively inaccurate under the law. The law provides that the shareholders
do indeed own the corporation. In most states, this is dictated by statute.
In Delaware, it is spelled out in case law.
B. Do Shareholders Resemble Owners?
At the core of the critique of the traditional view lies an appeal to
common sense: shareholders of public corporations simply do not resem-
ble other owners, such as sole proprietors. Professor Jill E. Fisch has
summarized the issue as follows: "From a practical perspective, share-
holders ... do not resemble traditional owners. They are a fluid and
fluctuating group of investors, many of whom hold only short-term inter-
ests, and perhaps most importantly, they do not exercise the control as-
sociated with traditional property rights.1 83 Essentially, the argument is
that because shareholders do not resemble owners, it does not make
sense to speak of them as owners or to afford them the rights associated
with ownership.
On its face, the argument seems reasonable. However, the response
of the traditionalist is both simple and intuitive: shareholders of public
corporations do resemble owners. This is because public corporations
are simply larger versions of small businesses. The only difference be-
tween the two is one of scale, in terms of size and the number of owners.
Such factors may affect the appearance of the equity interest, but they do
not alter its fundamental nature.
No one denies that a sole proprietor owns the sole proprietorship -
other than, perhaps, to say that a sole proprietor is the sole proprietor-
183. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J.
CORP. L. 637, 649 (2006). The issue has remained substantially the same since identified long ago by
Professors Berle and Means:
[.] Most fundamental of all, the position of ownership has changed from that of an active to
that of a passive agent....
[.] The spiritual values that formerly went with ownership have been separated from it....
[. The value of an individual's wealth... depend[s] on forces entirely outside himself and his
own efforts....
[- The value of the individual's wealth not only fluctuates constantly.., but it is subject to a
constant appraisal....
[] Individual wealth has become extremely liquid through the organized markets ....
[. Wealth is less and less in a form which can be employed directly by its owner ....
[.] Finally, in the corporate system, the "owner" of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol
of ownership while the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an
integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose
hands lies control.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 66-68.
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ship.' Nevertheless, by the time a company grows into a public corpora-
tion with thousands of shareholders, many feel comfortable denying that
its shareholders are owners. Apparently, at some point in the life of a
business, the nature of the equity interest changes dramatically and loses
its claim to ownership. However, it is never clear what that point would
be, or why."85
If a sole proprietor were to take on one or a few partners, together
they would own the business. This is clear even from the definition of
partnership, which includes the concept of ownership: "A partnership is
an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a busi-
ness for profit." ''1 Joint ownership is simply not a problem, and it does
not matter whether there are only a few partners or many. Thus, part-
nership cannot be the point at which the equity holders lose their owner-
ship interest.
Incorporation is the first point at which it can be argued that the na-
ture of the equity interest changes. When shareholders contribute cash
or other assets in exchange for shares of stock, the corporation becomes
the owner of the assets contributed. Thus, one could argue that share-
holders voluntarily relinquish their ownership claim. However, that
would be inaccurate. As we have seen, shares represent an ownership
interest in the firm. Thus, shareholders give up their ownership of the
business assets but receive ownership of the entity that holds those as-
sets. The ownership claim is not relinquished, but transformed.
Moreover, experience and common sense suggest that incorporation
itself does not cause the loss of the ownership interest. If a sole proprie-
tor or partners were to incorporate their businesses, few would care to
deny that they remain owners. Shareholders in closely held corporations
resemble owners as much as partners do. Thus, we must look elsewhere
to explain the loss of the ownership claim.
An initial public offering is another point at which it might be ar-
gued that the nature of the equity interest in a business changes. It
seems plausible that the process of going public would cause a funda-
mental change because of the dramatic differences between closely held
corporations and public corporations. However, nothing in federal se-
curities law states, or even suggests, that a public offering alters the fun-
damental nature of share ownership. To the contrary, the terms of stock
184. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 26, at 12 ("A ... customary approach would depict the
owner as the core of the enterprise and the other elements as inputs hired by the owner and having
only a very narrow interest in the enterprise."); id. at 5-6 (introducing sole proprietorships).
185. Cf. Dodd, supra note 140, at 1145-47 (discussing growth of firm in context of ownership).
186. UNIF. P'SHIp Acr § 6(1) (1914). See also REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997). The
original and revised versions of the Uniform Partnership Act disagree on whether partners are co-
owners of partnership property. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 25 ("A partner is co-owner with his
partners of specific partnership property holdings . ), with REvISED UNIF. P'SHIP Ac § 501 ("A
partner is not a co-owner of partnership property. ). However, they are in agreement that the
partners are the co-owners of the partnership business.
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are governed by state law. The same laws apply to corporations regard-
less of whether they are closely or publicly held.1
What appear to be fundamental differences are nothing more than
differing circumstances. A shareholder in a closely held corporation
seems different than a shareholder in a public corporation because she is
situated differently. Typically, she has a much larger percentage interest
in the corporation. This affects her power and influence within the com-
pany. That her behavior would change as a result is unremarkable. But
the difference is between shareholders, not corporations: in both public
and closely held corporations, majority' shareholders will have control,
minor shareholders will have very little power. 188 Thus, a public offering
does not transform the nature of share ownership.
Yet another candidate is based not on any particular action taken
by the business, but on the level of involvement by shareholders. Per-
haps shareholders lose their ownership claim when the corporation ex-
pands to the point that shareholders as a group are no longer involved in
the management of the business. This corresponds roughly to the public
offering explanation because shareholders in small businesses tend to be
active participants whereas shareholders in public corporations tend to
be passive investors. However, that is an oversimplification. Sharehold-
ers in a close corporation need not be actively involved in the business,
and shareholders in a public corporation may very well be. The corpo-
rate governance mechanism is the same in both cases: shareholders elect
directors (who may but need not be chosen from among themselves), and
directors appoint officers (who may or may not be shareholders or direc-
tors). There are close corporations in which the shareholders hire others
to run the business for them, and there are public corporations that are
run by large shareholders. Thus, public status is a very crude proxy for
shareholder involvement.
More importantly, involvement is a very poor determinant of own-
ership status. As a practical matter, it would be extremely difficult to
specify a level of shareholder involvement that would be necessary to
avoid forfeiture of the ownership interest. Similarly, there would be dif-
ficult issues concerning whether and how shareholders could reclaim
their ownership interest by becoming more involved. Surely if one public
corporation were to acquire another, the parent corporation should be
187. Some states have special statutes for closely held corporations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (2001). However, these provisions are optional. See, e.g., id. § 341(a). Closely held
corporations can be incorporated under general corporation laws, and most of them are. See
GEVURTZ, supra note 44, § 5.2, at 507 & n.84.
188. I deliberately use the term "minor shareholder" instead of "minority shareholder" to avoid
confusion. A minority shareholder is one who lacks a majority interest in a corporation. In a closely
held corporation, a large minority shareholder can have absolutely no control if there is a majority
shareholder. However, in a public corporation, a minority shareholder can have effective control if
there are no other shareholders with similar holdings. By "minor shareholder," I mean one with a
relatively insignificant interest such that they have no control, regardless of whether it be in a closely
held corporation or a public corporation.
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considered an involved owner by almost any standard. However, the law
never has required that owners be involved personally in the manage-
ment of their assets.8 9 Thus, it would be anomalous to require involve-
ment by shareholders.
Even if there were such a requirement, shareholders should be con-
sidered owners because they are involved in the management of the
business. They elect directors, which is an exercise of direct control over
the corporation as well as an exercise of indirect control over the busi-
ness. In addition, members of top management in public corporations
invariably are shareholders and often have significant holdings of the
company's stock. Thus, at least some shareholders almost always are ex-
ercising direct control over the business.
There are other shareholder-based factors that could be said to
change the nature of the equity interest. The size and duration of share-
holder investments are two examples. Like involvement, however, these
are poor determinants of ownership status. How much and how long
would shareholders have to hold investments to be considered owners?
Would ownership be assessed individually or collectively? In other situa-
tions, the law does not have such requirements for ownership. To be fair,
there are not many situations in which ownership interests are divided as
thinly as in public corporations. However, almost all shareholders own
multiple shares, and often there are many shareholders with holdings of a
size-a few percentage points-that is not uncommon in other situa-
tions.190 As for duration, there are plenty of situations where owners hold
their assets for only short periods. For example, most retail products
work their way through a number of distributors before reaching the ul-
timate consumer. Even real estate is often only a short-term investment,
whether it is held for development or speculation. Flipping 91 is a perfect-
ly valid investment strategy that does not undermine ownership; short-
term ownership is limited only in duration. Finally, even if these factors
were requirements of ownership, shareholders do satisfy them. The indi-
vidual shareholder who frequently trades in individual shares is only one
type of shareholder, and probably not a very common one. Much more
common is the institutional investor with large holdings. In addition,
many shareholders -individuals and institutions alike-follow an index-
ing strategy, pursuant to which they buy and hold securities.' 9' When in-
189. Adverse possession would be an exception. See SINGER, supra note 33, at 142. However, an
interest in a corporation cannot be adversely possessed.
190. To the extent that shareholders generally do not have larger holdings, it could be because
federal law makes it difficult to do so. See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 63, at 530-32.
191. Flipping is the process of "buy[ing] and then immediately resell[ing] securities or real estate
in an attempt to turn a profit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 670 (8th ed. 2004).
192. Indexing is "[t]he practice of investing funds to track or mirror an index of securities." Id. at
786. Because the index does not change very often, the investment strategy is essentially one of buy
and hold.
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stitutional investors do this, as they often do, the result is large invest-
ments held for long periods of time.
In short, there is no point at which the equity holders of a business
can be said to lose their ownership interests. Thus, it is difficult to con-
clude that they ever do. Every development in a business's life is a mat-
ter of degree rather than kind, and the underlying nature of the equity
interest remains the same: every share represents partial ownership of
the business. Of course, not all shareholders have an equal stake in the
business, so some shareholders will be more powerful than others. But
that is to be expected and in no way undermines the shareholders' collec-
tive ownership interest.
C. Do Shareholders Consider Themselves Owners?
Another common argument against shareholder ownership is based
on the perceptions of shareholders themselves:
It is obvious that the average stockholder does not think of himself
as a partial owner of the corporation, but as an investor free to
move into and out of the corporation without loyalty, simply as a
holder of an investment contract with different attributes from that
of the bondholder.
1 93
Implicitly, the argument continues: if shareholders do not even consider
themselves to be owners, why should society consider them so? This ar-
gument has intuitive appeal. Under such circumstances, it seems more
like a windfall to shareholders to acknowledge their ownership than like
a loss to deny it.
The issue of shareholder belief is one that would benefit from em-
pirical research. 194 The claim that shareholders do not consider them-
selves owners generally is made without any supporting evidence. How-
ever, the claim is not at all obvious. To the contrary, I maintain that
shareholders are part of the public which accepts the traditional view of
the corporation. 95 Unfortunately, I too lack scientific evidence to sup-
port my claim. Nevertheless, personal anecdotal evidence strongly sup-
ports the claim that most people, whether or not they are shareholders
themselves, believe that shareholders own the corporation. 196  This
193. Homer Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 BUs. LAW. 173, 177
(1981).
194. I have been able to find only one empirical study of shareholder opinion on the issue of own-
ership. It was a simple study conducted thirty years ago by Professors Soderquist and Vecchio. See
Soderquist & Vecchio, supra note 2. The study concluded that "shareholders expect to be treated as
'investors,' much like bondholders for example, and expect corporate managers to consider a wide
constituency when making corporate decisions." Id. at 840. However, the study did not purport to be
scientific. In fact, the questions in the study were worded vaguely, and it is not clear whether partici-
pants would believe they were asked legal questions, common sense questions, or normative questions.
Thus, the study is not very helpful for present purposes.
195. See supra text accompanying note 14.
196. Most people I have asked believe that it is obvious that shareholders are the owners of the
corporation, and are surprised to hear that there is any doubt. In fact, although I have come across
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should not be surprising. Most sources to which shareholders are ex-
posed support the traditional view, either explicitly or implicitly."9 This
is also true of many business and legal sources, including even education-
al texts.198 In fact, one of the key concepts that anyone who studies cor-
porations will learn is the "separation of ownership and control"' 9-
which, by its very terms, suggests that shareholders are owners even
though they are not managers. For shareholders to hear otherwise, they
would have to read articles in scholarly journals. Needless to say, most
shareholders probably do not do so very often.
In any event, the issue of what shareholders believe is irrelevant.
Awareness is not a prerequisite to ownership. Although I believe that
shareholders are aware of their status as owners, perhaps they are not.
Even if that were the case, it would not be a basis for depriving them of
their rights.
IV. WHY IT MATTERS
Thus far, I hope to have established that there is more to the claim
of shareholder ownership than academics generally admit. Contempo-
rary criticism does more to highlight the weaknesses of the traditional
view than it does to replace it, and there are strong reasons to believe
that the traditional view remains descriptively accurate. But why does it
matter? Why are claims of ownership, which may seem archaic and anti-
quated, so important? In this Part, I try to answer such questions.
On the most basic level, it is important because it (either) is (or is
not) true. In the words of Professor Melvin Eisenberg, "what is at stake
is simply getting things right; making sure that we employ a descriptive
apparatus that is correct as a positive matter."'" As a student of the law,
I care to know what it is that I am studying. The issue of ownership
would be sufficiently of interest as a purely intellectual matter, even if its
resolution were to have no consequences. In fact, however, it seems in-
conceivable that such a fundamental matter would be irrelevant as a
practical matter. To the contrary, it likely would be extremely signifi-
cant.
In this Part, I consider some of the ways in which ownership mat-
ters. Basically, it matters because it affects the allocation of rights in the
corporation. First, I argue that, because property is a much more power-
ful concept than contract, shareholder rights are likely to be stronger and
more secure if grounded in property than if grounded in contract. Then I
people who know nothing about corporations, I have not come across a nonacademic who actually
believed shareholders were not owners.
197. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 82, at 3; MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 109 (9th ed. unabr. 2005).
199. See generally KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 26, at 177-85.
200. Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 836.
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argue that, if shareholders are the owners of the corporation, corporate
governance must reflect shareholder primacy. Finally, I argue that, if
shareholders are owners, then directors serve the shareholders and ade-
quate accountability is indispensible. In other words, the issue of owner-
ship will have a significant impact on corporate law and the rights of all
corporate stakeholders. Thus, the issue is important regardless of the
normative desirability of shareholder rights. Advocates on both sides
should be concerned, albeit for very different reasons.
A. Foundation of Shareholder Rights
The foundation of a right can have significant ramifications in terms
of both interpretation and normative implications, and shareholder rights
are no exception. If the traditional view is correct, shareholder rights are
grounded in property law. If the nexus-of-contracts theory is correct,
they are grounded in contract. In this Section, I argue that shareholder
rights will be stronger and more secure under the traditional view than
competing theories because of its grounding in property law 1
I begin with a simple and (hopefully) uncontroversial observation:
that the source of a right will determine, to a great extent, how secure
that right is. For example, all other things being equal, a constitutional
right is more secure than a statutory right. This is because a legislature
may repeal a statutory right freely, while a constitutional right may be
repealed only by constitutional amendment. Similarly, a legal right is
more secure than a contractual right because a contractual right depends
entirely upon the parties while a legal right does not. Admittedly, the
distinction between legal and contractual rights can be blurred by various
considerations: for example, people generally have the legal right to the
enforcement of contracts; in addition, many legal rights can be altered or
waived by contract. However, contracts are not always entitled to en-
forcement,2 and many legal rules are mandatory.203 Moreover, property
is an area of law that is particularly stable and resistant to change.20
Thus, a right grounded in property can be expected to be more secure
than a right grounded in contract.
In addition, property law is significantly more robust than contract
law. Property is a powerful legal concept in American law. An owner is
a sovereign of sorts, with the power of control over the asset. Of course,
201. It is not clear what the source of shareholder rights would be under the communitarian
theory. Therefore, I will not elaborate on the status of shareholders thereunder. It should suffice to
note that, if shareholder rights are vulnerable under the contractarian theory, then they are up for
grabs under the communitarian theory.
202. See infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
204. "In part because of its importance, property law is unusually resistant to legal change....
Almost by definition ... property law resists changes to its contours for the very reason that change, as
such, strikes at what decision makers typically view as one of its core traits." Eduardo Mois6s Pefialv-
er & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1095, 1133-34 (2007).
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an owner's rights may be limited by the law in various ways. However,
an owner generally has a great deal of freedom to use the asset as she
pleases. 5 She also has the right to exclude others from the use of the as-
set." 6 In fact, the Constitution even provides owners with rights against
the state: in particular, property may not be taken without just compen-
sation.' This principle has been interpreted broadly enough that even
regulation that goes too far may be considered a compensable taking.
2°8
Finally, property rights generally are protected not only by liability rules,
but also by stronger sanctions, including injunctive relief and criminal
prosecution.
By comparison, contract is a much less powerful legal concept.
Generally, competent individuals are free to enter into private arrange-
ments. However, the Constitution does not protect the freedom of con-
tract. There was a time-the Lochner era-when the Due Process
Clause was interpreted to protect liberty of contract. 210  However, the
Supreme Court abandoned this interpretation during the New Deal
era.211 The Constitution does provide that "No State shall.., pass
any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. '21 2 However, as in-
terpreted, the Contract Clause does not have much bite."3 Today, states
are relatively free to regulate contractual arrangements. In fact, various
laws regulate not only whether people may contract on a matter-e.g.,
criminal laws against prostitution-but also how they may do so-e.g.,
federal laws regulating the sale of securities-and the substantive terms
of the contract-e.g., minimum wage laws.211 Moreover, these laws may
change at any time, further weakening the right to contract. Of course,
laws and changes in law can limit property rights as well. However, such
changes tend not to be nearly as disruptive of property law as they are of
contract law. A regulation may interfere with an owner's desired use of
205. Cf. SINGER, supra note 33, at 3 ("Ownership does not mean the absolute right to control
what one owns; rather, it is the fullest bundle of rights that the law will recognize.").
206. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730,
730 (1998) (arguing that "the right to exclude others is more than just 'one of the most essential' con-
stituents of property-it is the sine qua non").
207. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
208. "The Supreme Court has interpreted the takings clause to protect owners from fundamental-
ly unjust alterations of their property rights by the state, including unjust limits on their ability to use
their property as they wish." SINGER, supra note 33, at 676. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (setting forth a three-factor balancing test).
209. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 33, at 111 (describing injunctive relief as a nuisance remedy); id.
at 92 (describing injunctive relief as a remedy for trespass to chattels); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 810.09 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (describing criminal remedy for criminal trespass).
210. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,53,64 (1905).
211. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
213. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1983).
But see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L.
REv. 767,813-14 (1989).
214. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006) (federal securities law); ALA.
CODE § 13A-12-121 (LexisNexis 2005) (state law against prostitution); 820 ILL. CoM. STAT. 105/4
(1999 & Supp. 2009) (state minimum wage law).
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his property, but it may not eliminate the ownership claim (at least, not
without compensation). By comparison, a law may not only interfere
substantially with a contract, it may invalidate the contract entirely. In
other words, contracts exist at the whim of the legislature in a way that
property does not. Finally, enforcement of contract law generally is li-
mited to a liability rule.215 Thus, a right grounded in property can be ex-
pected to be stronger than a right grounded in contract.
Perhaps as important is the political dimension of property and con-
tract. Property is a very powerful concept in American consciousness.
Americans have always valued and respected property rights.216 In fact,
they remain quite passionate about property rights."7 Despite what the
experts have been saying for decades, Americans tend to have a very
traditional understanding of property:
Most people... conceive of property as things that are owned by
persons. To own property is to have exclusive control of some-
thing-to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away,
leave it idle, or destroy it. Legal restraints on the free use of one's
property are conceived as departures from an ideal conception of
full ownership.218
Legal experts often decry this powerful "mythology of property,"2 19 but
even they cannot truly escape its grasp.2°0
Once again, contract is not nearly as powerful a concept. Of course,
Americans generally appreciate the freedom of contract. However, they
are accustomed to restrictions on and prohibitions against many types of
215. See George M. Cohen, The Fault that Lies Within Our Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1445, 1445-46 & n.1 (2009).
216. "In no other country in the world is the love of property keener or more alert than in the
United States, and nowhere else does the majority display less inclination toward doctrines which in
any way threaten the way property is owned." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
638-39 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (13th ed. 1850); see also JAMES
W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS 43 (1992) ("Despite their differences over particular economic issues, the right to acquire and
own property was undoubtedly a paramount value for the framers of the Constitution."); Bret Boyce,
Property as a Natural Right and as a Conventional Right in Constitutional Law, 29 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 201, 245 (2007); Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property
Rights on the Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1135, 1136.
217. The reaction to the recent Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005), attests to this fact. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
AND POICES 1242-43 (2007) ("[T]he public repudiation of Kelo represents one of the most stunning
instances of popular constitutionalism in our nation's history.").
218. Grey, supra note 35, at 69; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 37, at 97-100 (describing differ-
ence between scientific and ordinary/layman understanding of property).
219. See, e.g., Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IowA L. REV. 277, 282 (1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations
and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2339 (1994)) (citing David Schultz, Political Theory and Le-
gal History: Conflicting Depictions of Property in the American Political Funding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 464, 466 (1993)).
220. See Grey, supra note 35, at 69 ("including most specialists in their unprofessional moments");
Williams, supra note 219, at 278 ("[T]he intuitive image is the 'common sense' of layfolk and experts
alike.").
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contracts.22' In fact, if only because of consumer protection laws, it is
probably fair to say that they have come to expect regulation. Moreover,
contract is not considered as inviolable as property: breach and default
are not nearly as offensive to ordinary sensibilities as trespass or tak-
ings.222
In short, rights are likely to be stronger and more secure if
grounded in property than in contract. Thus, it is important to know
which account of the corporation is correct. If shareholder rights are
grounded in contract, then they are more vulnerable than if they are
grounded in property.
An additional reason why shareholder rights would be more vulner-
able if based in contract is that they would not be inherent to the corpo-
ration, but solely a matter of voluntary exchange. As a result, they could
be watered down in a number of ways. Obviously, shareholders may
consent to reduced rights by approving a charter amendment to that ef-
fect. This is true under the traditional view as well. However, share-
holder rights also may be abridged by operation of contracts with other
stakeholders over which shareholders have no say. For example, a ge-
nerous employment contract may reduce the value of the shareholders'
residual interest, and a poison pill may limit a shareholder's ability to sell
in a hostile takeover. Such interference with shareholder rights may be
upheld under the business judgment rule,12 but at least are problematic if
shareholders are owners. However, if the corporation is merely a nexus
of contracts, then the fact that another contract could affect sharehold-
ers' residual rights not only would be perfectly legitimate, but should be
expected.
In addition, corporate law itself can work against shareholder rights
if, as contractarians suggest, default rules are based on hypothetical bar-
gains.24 For example, if shareholders consistently forego a given right in
exchange for consideration that either varies or is difficult to observe,
then a default rule based on the majoritarian default likely would reflect
an absence of the shareholder right without any corresponding compen-
sation. By comparison, a property-based default rule would require
compensation by requiring the exchange. In other words, corporate law
based on contract risks undermining shareholder rights, while corporate
law based on property only risks inefficiency.
Thus, the source of shareholder rights can make a huge difference.
Ownership may not be absolutely necessary to protect shareholder
221. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 (1981) (describing "When Misre-
presentation Prevents Formation of a Contract"); id. § 173 (describing "When Abuse of a Fiduciary
Relation[ship] Makes a Contract Voidable"); id. § 175 (describing "When Duress by Threat Makes a
Contract Voidable").
222. See Merrill & Smith, Interface, supra note 40, at 776-77 (explaining that, while contracts
"bind only the parties to the contract," property rights "bind 'the rest of the world"').
223. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
224. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 122, at 29-31.
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rights; contractarians believe that they can reach the same results
through contract. However, ownership can be an important considera-
tion. If shareholders are owners, then they are far less likely to be denied
the kinds of rights generally associated with ownership.
B. Shareholder Primacy
One of the most important ways in which shareholder ownership
matters is corporate governance. If shareholders own the corporation,
then corporate governance must reflect this. In this Section, I argue that
corporate governance must reflect shareholder ownership in terms of
both end and means. Ownership may not provide an easy answer to
every issue, or perhaps even to any particular issue. However, it will be
at least a significant factor in determining the contours of corporate go-
vernance.
If shareholders own the corporation, then the end of the corpora-
tion is clear: to pursue the interests of shareholders. Property is the right
of an owner to use an asset as she pleases, subject to any legal prohibi-
tions. When there is a single owner, there is no need for a governance
mechanism: whatever the owner-says, goes. The need for a governance
mechanism arises when there are multiple owners who may not agree on
how to use the asset. As previously discussed, different options are
available.25 The corporate form relies on a form of representative de-
mocracy: shareholders elect directors.
Under the traditional view, the pursuit of shareholder interests is
the only end of corporate governance that makes sense. The very pur-
pose of corporate governance is to facilitate decision making among the
various and dispersed owners. The board of directors becomes the proxy
for the shareholders. In a sense, it transforms the corporation into a vir-
tual sole proprietorship. Thus, the pursuit of shareholder interests is as
intrinsic to the governance of corporations as it is to the governance of
sole proprietorships. 226
By contrast, if there is no ownership claim on the corporation, then
the goal of corporate governance is up for debate. Contractarians insist
that the goal of shareholder wealth maximization can be secured without
property, but this is not clearly correct. In the first place, if the corpora-
tion is merely a nexus of contracts, it is counterintuitive that the goal
would be to pursue the interests of just one group of stakeholders. It
seems much more plausible that the goal would be to pursue the interests
of all of the corporate constituents, as communitarians insist. Of course,
contractarians back their claim with many strong arguments grounded in
225. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
226. It may be easier to change the goal of the corporation by legislative fiat than it would for the
sole proprietorship because of the separation of ownership and control, but it would be equally inap-
propriate.
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efficiency.227 However, not everyone finds their arguments to be persua-
sive:
Communitarians .... reject the legitimacy of existing bargains by
reference to power imbalances that make voluntary contracting im-
possible. They also... reject the claims of efficiency made on be-
half of shareholder primacy by denying the strength of the link be-
tween shareholder wealth and societal wealth [as well as] by
insisting that the appropriate calculus of social welfare includes
more than wealth.
228
The greatest weakness of the contractarian argument is that it can only
seek to persuade with policy arguments; it cannot compel with rights
talk. People inevitably will disagree as to those policy considerations.
Not only can people come to different conclusions as to what would be
efficient, but they also can reject efficiency as the goal. Contractarians
may consider this foolish, but they cannot consider it illegitimate. Thus,
if shareholders are owners then the end of corporate governance is clear,
but if they are not then it remains open to debate.
There is one potential problem that confronts the traditional view:
the existence of constituency statutes, which allow directors to consider
the interests of other stakeholders.29 I have considered constituency sta-
tutes in previous work, arguing that such legislation is fundamentally
misguided and ineffective, 230 and that adoption of constituency statutes
has been less-than-universal and ultimately insignificant as a practical
matter.2 1 Thus, I do not believe that constituency statutes are nearly as
problematic as they could be theoretically. However, to the extent that
they do pose a problem, the response of the traditional view is clear: pro-
visions that attempt to deny or disparage the ownership rights of share-
holders in a dramatic and fundamental way are illegitimate and perhaps
even unconstitutional.
32
At this point, it is worth noting that the goal of corporate gover-
nance should be understood broadly as facilitating the pursuit of share-
holder interests rather than a more narrow pursuit of shareholder wealth
maximization. 23  Of course, wealth maximization is in the shareholder
interests, and it is not unreasonable to consider the two generally inter-
changeable. However, shareholder interests can extend beyond wealth
maximization 3.2  In fact, there may be times when other interests may
227. See Velasco, supra note 2, at 442-51.
228. Id. at 456 (footnote omitted).
229. See id. at 462-63 & n.293 (describing and listing constituency statutes).
230. See id. at 463-64.
231. See id.
232. See Oswald, supra note 130, at 21-27 (describing takings argument against constituency sta-
tutes).
233. But see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
234. See, e.g., Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and Progressive
Corporate Law Via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L. 247, 249 (2008) (pro-
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trump wealth maximization. For example, notions of justice and morali-
ty may cause shareholders to forego reprehensible behavior that would
increase their wealth, even if such conduct is entirely legal. At other
times, they may be willing to engage in charitable conduct. This would
be perfectly legitimate-just as it would be for a sole proprietorship.
235
Thus, shareholder primacy does hold open the potential for socially re-
sponsible behavior.
However, when the corporate purpose is extended beyond share-
holder wealth maximization, it becomes important to ensure that share-
holder interests are being pursued. There are at least two potential con-
cerns. First, there is the issue of protecting the rights of shareholders
who disagree. How should decisions of whether, and to what extent,
shareholder wealth should be sacrificed for another purpose be made?
Of course, similar problems arise with any democratic process, and ma-
jority rule generally is accepted as a reasonable solution. However, given
that shareholders presume, quite reasonably, that the business will pur-
sue profit, it may be necessary and appropriate for courts to scrutinize
director decisions more closely as they diverge from shareholder wealth
maximization. Second, there is the issue of director motivation. Direc-
tors should be permitted to forego shareholder wealth maximization only
in the interests of shareholders, and consistent with their will. Directors
should not be permitted to forego profit for their own purposes, whether
it be out of altruistic concern for other constituencies or in order to bene-
fit pet charities. Once again, given the potential for director misconduct,
judicial supervision may be necessary and appropriate.
The means of corporate governance is a trickier issue. However, it
should not be too controversial to assert that, if the shareholders own the
corporation, the starting point (or null hypothesis) should be that share-
holders should be able to control the corporation. Of course, with the
corporate form, we quickly move away from this starting point. Corpora-
tions are controlled by directors. However, we must keep in mind the
reasons for the move. It is not out of social concern, as communitarians
might hope, so that the interests of the various stakeholders can be ba-
lanced by directors. Nor is it primarily out of paternalism, as some con-
tractarians might believe, so that business experts can be put in charge. 6
Rather, it is out of practical necessity: to accommodate numerous and
dispersed shareholders. Communitarians and some contractarians view
corporate governance as depriving the shareholders of control, but the
moting "an Aristotelian understanding of ownership" wherein owners act "in a way that is consistent
with the common good").
235. Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 36 ("Our response.., is: who cares? If the
New York Times is formed to publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should be
allowed to object.").
236. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("The theory
of our corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does not
create Platonic masters.").
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traditionalist knows that it is supposed to empower shareholders to exer-
cise control indirectly.
Through their right to elect directors, shareholders have the ulti-
mate say over the business-at least theoretically. Of course, having the
ultimate say does not mean shareholders must have the final say on each
and every issue. Delegation makes perfect sense, especially if the dele-
gates are business experts. 237 Nor does it necessarily mean that in every
case, more shareholder power is necessarily better. Periodic, high-level
control may be sufficient and, in many cases, superior to greater con-
trol.238 However, corporate governance rules must be about helping
shareholders rather than protecting them from themselves, and about fa-
cilitating shareholders rather than impeding them. Thus, it may make
sense to limit shareholder voice to the most important issues, but it does
not make sense to impose a voting system that deprives them of any real
say.
Let us consider shareholder voting rights in a little more detail. The
fact that shareholders are owners does not necessarily tell us exactly
what those voting rights should consist of. Issues such as how often elec-
tions should be held and what the voting standard should be must be
answered in the light of various policy considerations. For example, an-
nual elections are an obvious possibility, but staggered elections can have
the advantage of promoting board continuity. Neither option is intrinsi-
cally better than the other. However, if it comes to pass that staggered
boards regularly prevent shareholders from removing directors, then
they become difficult to justify under the framework of the traditional
view. Similarly, majority voting is an obvious candidate for the voting
standard, but plurality voting can prevent the costs associated with ensur-
ing the participation of rationally apathetic shareholders. 9 However, if
shareholders are not entirely apathetic and plurality voting regularly
prevents them from replacing directors, then plurality voting becomes
difficult to justify under the traditional view. Thus, ownership alone may
not decide voting issues in the abstract, but it does influence the analysis
significantly, and can limit the range of reasonable options in concrete
circumstances.
By contrast, if shareholders are not the owners, then the means of
corporate governance become debatable. The standard contractarian
answer probably would be that the means of corporate governance
would depend upon what the parties negotiated. Professor Bainbridge,
however, argues in favor of director primacy: he believes directors should
be pretty much free to decide how to pursue the goal of shareholder
237. See Velasco, supra note 2, at 441-42.
238. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 77-79 (1974) (discussing "the
trade-off between authority and responsibility [i.e., accountability]").
239. See Velasco, supra note 55, at 622-25.
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wealth maximization. 240 Communitarians also believe in director prima-
cy. However, because they reject the goal of shareholder wealth maximi-
zation, they believe directors should be free to balance the interests of
various stakeholders. 24' Other social responsibility theorists have pro-
posed what could be considered a "stakeholder primacy" theory, where
various stakeholders could have direct or indirect input into corporate
decision making.2 42 As previously mentioned, the precise rules of corpo-
rate governance must be based on policy considerations. However, if
shareholders are owners, the range of options is limited to those that
would facilitate the pursuit of shareholder interests. By contrast, if there
are no owners, those limits disappear, and the question of how corpora-
tions should be run becomes an open one.
Thus, the issue of shareholder ownership is important in the deter-
mination of both the end and means of corporate governance. It is poss-
ible for shareholder rights to be identical without an ownership claim; the
same results might be reached by contract or policy considerations alone.
However, ownership shifts the policy considerations decisively in favor of
shareholders.
C. Director Accountability
In the previous Section, I argued that if shareholders own the cor-
poration, the end and means of corporate governance must be share-
holder primacy, whereas, if they are not, shareholder primacy is merely
one possibility. In this Section, I argue that shareholder ownership has
significant ramifications for director accountability as well. The basic ar-
gument is very simple and familiar: if shareholders are owners, then the
directors work for them and should be accountable to them. Once again,
shareholder ownership may not resolve any specific issue concerning the
appropriate level of accountability, but it certainly will be a significant
factor in the analysis.
Corporate law is very clear that directors have the authority to
manage the business and affairs of the corporation consistent with their
own business judgment. 43 Broad director authority is an important value
in corporate law.2" However, its value must be considered in context.
Corporate law limits director authority in two important and related
240. See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 573-74.
241. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 253.
242. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 123-26 (1976); Lynne L.
Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19,
107-12 (1988).
243. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
244. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("A cardinal precept of the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the
business and affairs of the corporation.").
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ways: first, by fiduciary duties, and second, by accountability mechan-
isms.2 45 Both are essential elements of corporate governance.
Although corporate law grants directors a great deal of discretion, it
also charges them with fiduciary duties to pursue the interests of the
shareholders. The one cannot be considered without reference to the
other. Yet commentators often focus on director discretion and down-
play fiduciary duties. The reason for this is the level of judicial deference
afforded to director decisions under the business judgment rule. 46 The
standard is extremely permissive:
[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, be-
lieves a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extend-
ing through "stupid" to "egregious" or "irrational", provides no
ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the
process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith
effort to advance corporate interests. 47
Thus, it is not unreasonable to characterize the business judgment rule as
a policy of non-review rather than a standard of review.2 48 Because al-
most any business decision made by unconflicted directors will be
upheld, it is not surprising that some commentators would suggest that
directors are free to do as they please, without regard to shareholder in-
terests.2 49 However, they are wrong.
Directors are not free to do as they please. They are required to
pursue the interests of shareholders. As the Michigan Supreme Court
stated famously long ago:
There should be no confusion .... A business corporation is orga-
nized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to
the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
25 0
Fiduciary duties require that the directors act in good faith in the best in-
terests of the corporation and that they exercise the care of an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position under similar circumstances.251 All of
245. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141,325, 327 (2001 & Supp. 2008).
246. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
247. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment
rule.") (footnote omitted).
248. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83,88-89 (2004).
249. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 299-305; D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy
Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 284-88 (1998).
250. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668,684 (Mich. 1919); see also supra note 168.
251. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01, at 138-39 (1994); see also MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)-(b) (2008).
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this is just as clear under corporate law as the breadth of director author-
ity.
On the surface, these two sets of standards may seem contradictory.
However, they are not; one is a standard of conduct and the other is a
standard of review.252 "A standard of conduct states how an actor should
conduct a given activity or play a given role. A standard of review states
the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor's conduct to de-
termine whether to impose liability or grant injunctive relief." 3  The
standard of conduct is primary. It sets forth the director's obligations.
The standard of review merely determines how the fiduciary duty will be
enforced. Thus, it is secondary and instrumental. The business judgment
rule is lenient because, for various prudential reasons, the courts are he-




If directors... who violate the standards of [conduct] sometimes
escape liability because of a less demanding standard of review, it is
not because they have acted properly, but because utilizing stan-
dards of review that were fully congruent with the relevant stan-
dards of conduct would impose greater costs than the costs of let-
ting some persons who violated their standards of conduct escape
liability.
255
That scholars would focus primarily on the standard of review is un-
fortunate.2 56  Directors are not protected from liability so that they can
ignore the interests of shareholders; to the contrary, it is so that they may
pursue the interests of shareholders freely and aggressively. This im-
munity benefits shareholders by protecting them from overly risk-averse
decision makers. However, judicial deference is premised upon trust in
directors. If directors cannot be trusted-perhaps because they are led
to believe that they can ignore the standard of conduct-then such judi-
cial deference is wholly inappropriate. 57 Because the business judgment
rule is premised upon a healthy respect for fiduciary duties, scholars un-
dermine the doctrine when they overemphasize it.
This leads to a discussion of accountability. According to former
Delaware Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey, "[tihe defining tension in
252. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Stan-
dards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
253. Id. at 437.
254. See Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
821, 830-33 (2004) (discussing justifications for judicial deference under the business judgment rule);
see also Eisenberg, supra note 252, at 443-45.
255. Eisenberg, supra note 252, at 467-68.
256. Communitarian reliance on the business judgment rule is especially ironic because it under-
mines their own goals. For example, Blair and Stout argue that the business judgment rule gives direc-
tors the freedom they need to balance the competing interests of stakeholders. Blair & Stout, supra
note 9, at 299-305. However, in order to do this, directors must be willing to ignore the legal standards
of conduct. It is unclear why such directors, who consider themselves bound only by the standards of
review, would follow the standards of conduct recommended by Blair and Stout rather than pursue
their own interests.
257. See Velasco, supra note 254, at 834-35.
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corporate governance today is the tension between deference to direc-
tors' decisions and the scope of judicial review" 258-in other words, be-
tween authority and accountability. 5 9 As I have argued elsewhere, ba-
lancing these competing interests means that neither can be ignored:
[The business judgment rule and the entire fairness test] provide
complementary insights that are equally fundamental to corporate
law: that, as a general matter, the interests of shareholders and di-
rectors are aligned such that directors can be trusted and need not
be policed very closely, but that, when their interests conflict, direc-
tors cannot be trusted and must be subject to careful judicial scruti-
ny. Thus, the two standards represent opposite sides of the same
coin. They are the twin pillars of enforcement of fiduciary duties in
corporate law that provide balance between the competing values
of authority and accountability.2
In almost every other context, the importance of accountability for deci-
sion makers is unquestioned. While there may be reasons to believe that
corporate governance uniquely allows for reduced accountability,261 it is
important to maintain an adequate level.
In corporate law, accountability comes in two major forms: share-
holder self-help and judicial intervention. Self-help should be relatively
unobjectionable. Shareholders can protect themselves by selling their
shares and by electing directors. Because the right to transfer is a stan-
dard right of ownership, shareholders should be able to sell their shares
freely-at least presumptively. Restrictions on this right may be neces-
sary, but they should be disfavored in light of the strong property law
policy against restraints on alienation.262 The right to vote should be con-
sidered even more sacred. As a matter of property law, control is a stan-
dard right of ownership, and the election of directors is how shareholders
exercise their control. Of course, some restrictions on the control of as-
sets are always necessary. However, because it is the directors who exer-
cise control over the corporate assets, legal restrictions should fall upon
them rather than the shareholders. Moreover, as a matter of corporate
law, the courts have recognized that "[tihe shareholder franchise is the
ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power
rests. '263 In other words, the shareholder right to elect directors is fun-
damental to corporate law. Thus, if shareholders are owners, restrictions
on this right to vote are problematic and should be permitted only when
necessary.
258. E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 Bus.
LAW. 393,403 (1997).
259. See Bainbridge, supra note 248, at 84.
260. Velasco, supra note 254, at 826.
261. See id. at 833-34.
262. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 4.1-4.5 (1983);
SINGER, supra note 33, § 6.7.2, at 284-89.
263. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also MM Cos. v.
Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1128-29 (Del. 2003) (quoting Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659-63).
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Judicial intervention is a more complicated matter. This is because
it involves not only shareholder action, but also judicial action. Society
has the right to decide not to expend the resources necessary to vindicate
each and every right fully. This could justify a standard of review that is
more lenient than the standard of conduct. In addition, society could de-
cide that judicial intervention is a poor way of effecting corporate ac-
countability because courts are not business experts 64 This, too, could
justify a lenient standard of review. However, there are times when even
the imperfect tool of judicial intervention is superior to the alternative-
a lack of accountability for directors.
Exactly how much judicial intervention is appropriate is a policy
question that cannot be answered merely by reference to shareholder
ownership. In previous work, I have suggested where the lines could be
drawn.265 This is not the venue to revisit such arguments. The point of
the current discussion is simply that, if shareholders are owners, then the
range of plausible answers is narrowed significantly. The relevant con-
siderations are the benefits to shareholders and the costs involved. Thus,
judicial intervention is less important when directors can be trusted to
pursue the interests of shareholders and when shareholder self-help is ef-
fective; conversely, it is more important whenever directors cannot be
trusted and when shareholders cannot protect themselves. However, if
shareholders are not owners, then policy considerations can trump
shareholder rights more easily.
In short, if shareholders are owners, then the directors work for
them and shareholders will have the right to hold directors accountable.
There may be reasons for limiting shareholder rights in specific ways, but
not to the point where directors become unaccountable, as a legal or
practical matter. Neither the directors themselves nor other stakeholders
have a legitimate interest in reducing the accountability of directors for
pursuing the interests of shareholders.
V. CONCLUSION
I now conclude with a more detailed account of the traditional view.
Here, I attempt to synthesize various claims made throughout this Ar-
ticle in the form of an easily digestible narrative. In doing so, I hope to
demonstrate not only that the traditional view is perfectly viable, but also
why it is reasonable for those outside of the academy to adhere to it.
The central tenet of the traditional view is that the shareholders
own the corporation. This view is widely held outside of the academy
because it is fairly obvious. Businesses have owners: sole proprietorships
have one owner; partnerships have multiple owners. Corporations may
have as few as one owner, but may have many thousands. The form of
264. See Velasco, supra note 254, at 831 & n.30.
265. See id. at 870-87; Velasco, supra note 55, at 656-59.
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business organization is a legal technicality; there is nothing in it that
necessarily affects ownership. Thus, the corporation is capable of being
owned if the law says it is. And it would be anomalous for the law to say
otherwise.
The concept of ownership is strongly implicit in our understanding
of the corporation. For example, the corporation is nearly universally
described as exhibiting a separation of ownership and control. Of course
the phrase "separation of ownership and control" is not itself law, but
only a description of the law which may or may not be accurate. Howev-
er, its ubiquity is telling. On an even more basic level, shareholders own
shares. The very term "shares" connotes an ownership interest; this is
consistent with the use of the term with respect to partnerships. Share-
holders are also said to hold the equity interest. This term also connotes
ownership, as every homeowner will attest. To be fair, neither term is
entirely free of ambiguity. Both terms could refer to an ownership inter-
est in the assets of the business, for example. However, shareholders do
not, in fact, own those assets; the corporation, as a separate entity, does.
Alternatively, these terms could refer to ownership of the residual claim
on the assets of the corporation. This would be consistent with the tradi-
tional view because, as owners, shareholders hold the residual claim.
However, many academics would claim that shareholders own only the
residual claim, and not the corporation itself166 Yet there is no explana-
tion for why the terms "shares" and "equity" are used in this limited re-
spect only for corporations, and not for other forms of business organiza-
tion. In fact, corporate statutes do not specifically provide that
shareholders are residual claimants. If shareholders are, it is only be-
cause they are owners.
Of course, it is not sufficient to say that ownership is "obvious" and
"implicit." We must look to what the law actually says. The Model
Business Corporation Act, and the law of many states, explicitly provides
that shareholders are indeed owners of the corporation.2 67 The Delaware
General Corporation Law contains no such provision. However, the De-
laware courts have understood this to be the case.268 Moreover, the De-
laware Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed the traditional view as the
basis for the rules regarding derivative litigation. 9 Thus, the law does
provide that shareholders are owners.
But perhaps the law is wrong. After all, shareholders do not resem-
ble owners in many respects. For example, it is often argued that share-
holders do not have control, one of the most important aspects of owner-
ship. 270 However, shareholders do have control. This is most obviously
266. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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true when there is only one shareholder. When a sole proprietor incor-
porates his business, no one doubts that he has control and remains the
owner. Similarly, no one doubts that a parent corporation controls, and
owns, its (wholly owned) subsidiaries. Thus, the ultimate power of con-
trol does reside in the shareholders.
It is often argued that public corporations present a very different
circumstance.27' Dispersed shareholders have very little control over the
corporation legally, and almost none in fact. However, this simplistic ob-
servation fails to appreciate the complexity of corporate structure. It is
true that shareholders have little direct power over the corporation. But
this is because dispersed shareholders cannot be expected to manage the
business effectively. Thus, the law provides that shareholders elect direc-
tors to manage the business on their behalf. Shareholders are free to
elect directors from among their own numbers, but they are not required
to do so. In any event, through the directors-their elected representa-
tives- the shareholders exercise indirect control over the corporation.
It is often argued that the extent of director authority undermines
the shareholders' ownership claim: the directors have direct control over
the corporation, and the business judgment rule ensures that they will
not be held accountable for almost any decision.27 2 However, this is
another oversimplification. Judicial intervention is only one means of
holding directors accountable. Shareholders can also engage in self-help
through the use of their two fundamental rights: the right to vote and the
right to sell shares. It is de rigueur to note that the shareholder right to
vote is extremely weak. However, recent developments have shown that
the right is not nearly as weak as often was believed.273 In addition,
shareholders have the right to sell their shares. As dissatisfied share-
holders sell their shares in increasing numbers, the value of the corpora-
tion drops. This not only sends a clear signal to management but also
subjects them to the risk of a hostile takeover. At least in extreme cases,
the market for corporate control is capable of returning power to the
shareholders.
Moreover, the role of the judiciary in corporate governance is often
misunderstood. It is the role of the judiciary "to say what the law is.
'274
The courts tell us that directors are bound to use their powers to pursue
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. More specifi-
cally, under the duty of care directors must make informed decisions, and
under the duty of loyalty they must avoid conflicts of interest. This is
what defines the role of directors; this is what is expected and demanded
of them. Enforcement is a separate matter. Because judges are not
business experts, and because they understand the nature of risk and
271. See supra Part II.B.
272. Velasco, supra note 2, at 430.
273. Id. at 419-20.
274. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803).
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hindsight bias, they are not inclined to intervene in business affairs ex-
cept when necessary. The business judgment rule is essentially a litiga-
tion management device. It shields the substance of business decisions
from judicial review almost entirely and provides a strong presumption
that the duty of care has been satisfied. However, when the duty of
loyalty is at stake, the courts engage in much more exacting review under
the entire fairness test."5 This structure makes sense, given the institu-
tional limitations of the courts: when directors can be trusted, judicial re-
view is unnecessary and perhaps harmful, but when directors cannot be
trusted, judicial review becomes necessary. The beneficial consequence
of this structure is that directors are free to exercise their business judg-
ment without fear of liability. There is, however, an unfortunate conse-
quence: directors can get away with almost anything, provided only that
they avoid the appearance of self-dealing. From this unfortunate side ef-
fect, academics sometimes argue that directors are free to do as they
please. 6
Of course, directors are not free to do as they please. They are not
free to engage in self-dealing, which is where the true risk of misbehavior
lies. At most, they are free to choose to benefit other stakeholders at the
expense of shareholders. Social responsibility theory ultimately depends
upon this sort of altruism: directors are expected to ignore the mandates
of law and the rights of shareholders in order to benefit not themselves,
but other stakeholders. One might not be considered unreasonable for
concluding that this risk is a relatively minor one. Besides, directors
could do even this only through subterfuge. If directors were to admit
that they were setting aside the short-term and long-term interests of
shareholders and pursuing the interests of other stakeholders as such (in
a significant way), then their decisions would not be upheld by the courts.
Constituency statutes notwithstanding, the law is clear: directors are free
to choose among means, but not among ends. As a practical matter, re-
gardless of what they do, directors always maintain the fagade of pur-
suing the long-term interests of the shareholders in order to preserve the
presumption of the business judgment rule. Thus, even if directors are
able to get away with doing as they please, they are not legally "free" to
do so.
The fact that directors theoretically may be able to get away with
significant misconduct does not impugn shareholder ownership. It is
merely the result of imperfect enforcement. But, of course, the law is al-
ways enforced imperfectly. Perfect enforcement is prohibitively expen-
sive. Thus, society (or the government) must always decide upon an ap-
propriate level of enforcement, whether explicitly or implicitly. If the
business judgment rule is too lax, then it ought to be revised. Likewise,
the entire fairness test may be too lax, or perhaps too strict. I tend to be-
275. See supra Part IV.C.
276. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
No. 3]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
lieve that both are more-or-less appropriate, at least in principle (al-
though, as I have argued elsewhere, I believe that there is a need for a
revised intermediate standard of review to deal with cases of structural
bias). But the broader point is this: the law of fiduciary duties is clear as
to the standard of conduct, and if the standards of review provide inap-
propriate levels of enforcement, then they should be reconsidered.
Finally, it might be argued that directors owe their fiduciary duties
not the shareholders, but to the corporation as a separate entity. This is
not a fair statement of the law. Courts generally acknowledge that direc-
tors owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.2"
In any event, it does not make much difference. If fiduciary duties are
owed to the corporation as a separate entity, then that entity is distinct
not only from the shareholders but also from all of its constituents. In
other words, directors must treat the corporation as a separate entity-
like a sole proprietorship of sorts-and maximize its wealth, and not the
collective wealth of the various stakeholders. This corporate wealth ul-
timately redounds to the benefit of the shareholders who, as owners,
hold the residual claim on the corporate assets.
Once it is established that shareholders are owners, certain conse-
quences follow. Most importantly, their status as owners becomes se-
cure. They cannot be denied that status without just compensation.
Moreover, the role of corporate governance becomes clear: it is to facili-
tate shareholder primacy in terms of both ends and means. This does not
mean that shareholders must be given direct control; effective indirect
control may be sufficient and even superior as a practical matter. Nor
does ownership provide a necessary answer for any particular question of
corporate governance. Any number of rules may be perfectly accepta-
ble, provided that they do not stand in the way of shareholder primacy.
Finally, if directors are the elected representatives of the shareholders,
then it is appropriate for them to be accountable to the shareholders.
Again, the particular rules by which they might be held accountable can
be subject to debate. However, they cannot be veiled efforts to shield
directors from accountability.
In short, if the traditional view is correct, then shareholders are
owners and corporate governance must be primarily about them and
their interests. However, if shareholders are not owners, then there is
room to discuss whether contractarians or communitarians have the bet-
ter policy arguments. Either way, the issue of shareholder ownership is a
central one for corporate law.
277. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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